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Note About the Sources
●

al-Insān al-kāmil min kalām al-Shaykh al-Akbar Muḥyiddīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, Mahmoud
al-Ghurab.
This book is a compilation of direct excerpts pertaining to the subject of the perfect man.

They are gleaned from Ibn ʿArabī’s major works, predominantly al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyya. It is
important to note that quotes referenced to this book are al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s own words.
●

al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyya, Ibn ʿArabī.
This thesis relies primarily on Osman Yahya’s edition of al-Futūḥāt (1985). Due to the

fact that his edition is incomplete, scholars often rely on Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabīa’s edition
(1911). Therefore, both editions have been used and are differentiated in the footnotes by their
years of publication.

4

Their life came from that close, insistent sun
And in its vivid rays they shone as one.
There in the Simorgh’s radiant face they saw
Themselves, the Simorgh of the world- with awe
They gazed, and dared at last to comprehend
They were the Simorgh and the journey’s end.
They see the Simorgh –at themselves they stare,
And see a second Simorgh standing there;
They look at both and see the two are one,
That this is that, that this, the goal is won.
…
And silently their shining Lord replies:
‘I am a mirror set before your eyes,
And all who come before my splendor see
Themselves, their own unique reality;
You came as thirty birds and therefore saw
These selfsame thirty birds, not less nor more;
…
Though you have struggled, wandered, travelled far,
It is yourselves you see and what you are.’1

1

Farīd al-Dīn ʿAttār , The Conference of The Birds. (Penguin Books, 1984), 149-150.
5

Introduction
A natural and profound mystification dwells in the aura of shadows, reflections, and
mirrors. There is an unspoken promise of knowledge being held in, and potentially revealed
through, a reflective surface. Memory and imagination summon the image of an oracle’s crystal
ball, and one wonders what the oracle sees besides her own reflection. Devoid of the lure of a
scintillating crystal ball, even crude shadows on a cave wall can captivate. Plato’s prisoners in
the cave prided themselves on their skills in a game of shadow conjecture. Even though their
gazes fell on a solid wall, the feeble shadows left the prisoners in a trance. Before a better
reflective surface, Narcissus stared at his image in the lake and into his own demise. And far
beyond the reflective capacities of crystal balls, cave walls, or the surface of water, mirrors are
the image representors par excellence. In the same measure that they represent images, mirrors
represent paradoxes. The image in the mirror treads the line between existence and nonexistence,
embodying a subtle but quintessential theme in Muḥy al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī’s (d.1240) thought.
The mirror image, like imagination, is an isthmus; the encounters between spectator and
reflection before a mirror encompass the possibility of immense layers of knowledge as do
encounters in the imaginal world. Of equal mystification to the mirror itself is the metaphor of
the mirror, which is ubiquitous in sufi texts. Similar to the water and the vessel, the mirror is
often used as an insightful yet straightforward metaphor invoked to illustrate an image of
simultaneous similarity and difference, or purity and impurity. It is one of the most prominent
images in Sufi literature often employed in capturing the crowning moments of the mystical
journey. At the end of an arduous adventure, ʿAttār’s (d.1221) birds reach their goal. Out of the
congregation of birds who embark on the quest to find their Lord, only thirty arrive. The thirty
birds (sī murg) stand face to face with the Simorgh, and the correspondence ceases to be lost on
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them.2 In Him, they see themselves reflected, and see Him reflected in themselves. Their Lord,
the Simorgh, introduces Himself to them as a mirror set before their eyes, in which the onlookers
see their reality.3 The quest in actuality was an encounter with the self before a mirror.
This motif occurs in Najm al-Dīn Kubrā’s (d.1221) notion of the Witness in Heaven.
According to Kubrā, upon reaching the highest station on the sufi path, the mystic encounters his
heavenly guide, an encounter characterized by reciprocity. A mirrored ascent on the part of the
mystic and descent on the part of his guide takes place, until man realizes he is face to face with
himself, standing as both witness and witnessed.4
An unassuming yet powerful metaphor, the mirror is manipulated to serve the context in
which it is invoked, from the mystic journey in ʿAttār and Kubrā, to love in Aḥmed al-Ghazālī
(d.1126), to Being in ʿAyn al-Quḍat Hamadānī (d.1131). Sufi texts are infused with the mirror.
However, the metaphor is not treated as an independent concept, a terminology specific to the
field and deserving explanation. For instance, the mirror does not receive an entry in Jurjānī’s
book, al-Taʿrīfāt, in which he collects and explains the most important sufi semantics.5 Certainly,
this is justified as the ‘mirror’ as a term is devoid of the complexity or sophistication necessary
to warrant a definition or explanation. Nevertheless, the mirror is mentioned profusely in term
indexes of the different sufi texts and with several variations. The mirror is treated as a metaphor
adjustable to the image it aims to convey.
In persian, the original language of the epic of the Conference of the Birds, sī murg means thirty birds.
The correspondence between the number of the birds and the name of the Simorgh has been pointed out
by many scholars, the significance of which is iterated in the excerpt provided earlier, where the mirror
metaphor is foundational. See page 5.
3
ʿAttār, The Conference of The Birds, 149-150.
4
Henry Corbin, Man of Light in Iranian Sufism, (New York: Omega Publications, 1994), 15, 19, 83. The
theme of ‘the contemplator and contemplated’ is central in Corbin’s book. In concomitance with it, the
mirror metaphor is frequently used both in Corbin’s own writing and in the primary sources he quotes.
The sources extend from Hermetic texts to the teachings of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā, and ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla al-Semnānī, among others.
5
Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī, al-Taʿrīfāt, (Cairo: Maktabat Mostafa al-Halaby, 1938).
2
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In reading Ibn ʿArabī’s writings, the mirror surfaces frequently, or looms in the
background unnamed. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s masterful writing is uniquely visual; he paints
vibrant images, which effortlessly become animated in the reader’s mind. Even in the absence of
an explicit mention of the metaphor, the image of a mirror organically forms and offers a fitting
visual representation to several of the concepts, moments, and connections in which Ibn ʿArabī
delves. The frequency at which the mirror metaphor occurs in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s writings is
not what substantiates its significance. Rather, the mirror earns its significance from the
importance of the contexts where it operates and from the profoundness of the notions it is
employed to deliver.
Reviewing secondary sources in preparation for this project, only two articles were found
that paid the mirror metaphor special attention. Souad al-Hakim’s article, “Unity of Being in Ibn
ʿArabī - A Humanist Perspective” provides a concise exposition of the theory of Unity of Being,
its misconceptions, and its practical application in the lives of humans. Al-Hakim writes, “The
most important metaphor used by Ibn ʿArabī to depict the relation between God, the world, and
man in particular, remains that of the mirror.”6 She dedicates a brief section to explicitly examine
the significance of the metaphor in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s thought; however, the importance of the
metaphor is evident throughout the article. Interestingly, in several secondary sources, the mirror
metaphor is employed in explaining Unity of Being.
The second article is “Ibn 'Arabi's Polished Mirror: Perspective Shift and Meaning
Event” by Michael Sells. In the article, Sells addresses Ibn ʿArabī’s writing style, contrasting his
use of poetry and prose, and literary and expository rhetoric. Sells discusses the conundrums of
translating Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical texts. While admitting to al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s genius, Sells
Souad al-Hakim, “Unity of Being in Ibn ‘Arabī – A Humanist Perspective,” The Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi
Society 36 (2004), retrieved from https://ibnarabisociety.org/unity-of-being-in-ibn-arabi-souad-hakim.
6
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points out two main obstructions, namely Ibn ʿArabī’s use of metaphors, and his ‘deliberate’
disregard, or intentional ambiguity when using reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns. The themes
of the article are presented through an in depth analysis and translation of the first few passages
of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. Sells addresses the perspective shift resulting from the polishing of the
mirror, wherein the polished mirror loses its visibility to the image it reflects. This is an allusion
to the divine manifestation which ensues from self-effacement.7 Sells concludes the article with,
“ I suggest that the metaphor of the mirror is a central and integral feature within the Andalusian
master's writing, one that leads the reader into a reenactment of the perspective shift.”8
The mirror metaphor has been noticed by both primary and secondary scholarship and
given varying degrees of interest. However, it appears that the predominant reception of the
metaphor is restricted to a momentary acknowledgement, after which the metaphor is neglected
and deemed peripheral. What this thesis suggests is that this metaphor warrants further
bewilderment. Instead of a cursory glance at the mirror as a convenient metaphor, the suggestion
is to stand before it with more ḥayrā in order to witness the depths to which the roots of this
metaphor reach. Then the question might arise, of whether the mirror is merely a metaphor at all.
The aims of this thesis are bifold, immediate and ambitious. As for the latter, this thesis
hopes that the scrutiny paid to the mirror metaphor here would engender an interest towards
evaluating the place of this metaphor in al-Shaykh al-ʾAkbar’s thought at large. This
encompasses, but is not restricted to, a reevaluation of the meaning of Unity of Being through the
lens of the mirror metaphor.
The immediate aim of this thesis is to explore the mirror metaphor in al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s thought in relation to ontology and epistemology, more specifically, his conception of
Michael Sells, “Ibn 'Arabi's Polished Mirror: Perspective Shift and Meaning Event”, Studia Islamica, no.
67 (1988): 121. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1595976.
8
Sells, “Ibn 'Arabi's Polished Mirror,” 146.
7
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Being, the purpose of creation, and the perfect man. These focal points have been selected due to
their fundamental presence in Ibn ʿArabī’s perception of the world at large. As will be elucidated
in the second chapter, knowledge is the purpose of creation for Ibn ʿArabī, and the perfect man is
the means of achieving this purpose. This nexus provides a panoptic view of al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s thought, as it connects a constellation of the seminal interlocutors of his doctrine. The
nexus of the perfect man and knowledge naturally invites into the conversation Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas
on the divine names, the image, the Muḥammadan Reality, and more. Analyzing the manner in
which the mirror occurs in relation to these themes hopes to formulate a valuable reading of the
metaphor’s position in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s understanding.

10

——— Chapter 1 ———

Ontology and the Mirror

There is nothing in existence but Him, and Existence can only be benefited from Him. No
entity (ʿayn) for an existent would appear without His manifestation. The mirror is the
presence of possibility and al-Ḥaqq is the onlooker. The image is you according to your
capacity, either an angel or an orbit (malak aw falak), human or horse. Akin to the image
in the mirror [appearing] according to the mirror’s own form of height, width, roundness,
and differences in shape, while it is a mirror in every case. In the same way, the possible
things are like shapes in possibility. The divine manifestation earns the possible things
their being, and the mirror earns them their shapes… Clearer than this, it cannot get
except through declaration.9
Muḥy al-Din Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya, vol. 3, (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Arabia, 1911), 80,
quoted in Mahmoud al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya wa al-radd ʿala Ibn Taymiyya min kalam
al-Shaykh al-Akbar Muḥy al-Din Ibn al-ʿArabī, 2nd ed (Matba’at Nadr, 1993), 476.
9
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I.

Unity of Being

“He asked me, ‘Who are you?’ I replied, ‘Apparent non-existence.’” 10
The mention of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s name is often closely followed by references to
Oneness of Being or Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd). Even though, according to William
Chittick, the term is not found in Ibn ʿArabī’s works, the aspect of unity is seminal to al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s conception of reality.11 A hyperfocus on unity alone in Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine, however,
can impair the attempt of formulating a comprehensive reading of his thought at large.12 Similar
to the various binary relationships which ultimately form a holistic understanding of God in
Islam, i.e. immanence and transcendence, beauty and majesty, unity has multiplicity as its
oppositional corollary. Ibn ʿArabī lends both poles plentiful attention as they permeate several of
his core notions that to overlook one of the two would require a conscious effort.
As pointed out earlier, the phrase ‘Unity of Being’ does not occur in al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s writing, a fact which is undoubtedly curious. Therefore, the discrepancy between the
total absence of the term ‘Unity of Being’ from his work and the persistent attachment of
scholarship over the ages to approach his work through the lens of Unity of Being specifically is
puzzling. Chittick puts the subject of wujūd in the Akbarian doctrine into perspective by saying,
“Ibn ʿArabī frequently discusses wujūd, but there is no special internal reason why his followers
would have extracted this particular term from his writings and placed it at the center of their
concerns.”13 Chittick singles out Ṣadr al-Dīn Qunawī for placing much attention on wujūd in an
effort to engage the Akbarian teachings with philosophy.

10

al-Hakim, “Unity of Being in Ibn ‘Arabī”
William Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 79.
12
William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn ʿArabī and the Problem of Religious Diversity, (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994), 15.
13
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, xviii.
11
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The shortcomings of entitling al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s conception of Being at large as
‘Unity of Being’ are bifold. First, while the title accurately represents Ibn ʿArabī’s position on
Being as one, it fails to emphasize the distinction between Being and beings, a distinction which
is often inconspicuous. Since Being can only be witnessed in beings, the difference could escape
recognition. It becomes possible to forget that Being qua Being has never been seen. Akin to the
example of a polished mirror; despite the commonplaceness of experiencing looking in a mirror,
the mirror itself is hardly ever noticed.14 Even when the mirror is noticed, it is never seen.15 Due
to the elusiveness of the discourse on Being, Toshihiko Izutsu made a point of highlighting the
nature of the subject. He writes, “‘Existence’ in this particular context is not the kind of
‘existence’ of which all of us naturally have a common-sense notion… Rather it is ‘existence’ as
it reveals itself only to a transcendental consciousness.”16 Had the distinction between Being and
beings been as obvious as may be assumed, no allegations of pantheism would have been
directed at Ibn ʿArabī, which prompts the second problem with ‘Unity of Being’.
The concept of ‘Unity of Being’ arrives with a constellation of preconceptions, which
feed further assumptions and hinder the possibility of a relatively objective approach. Abul Ela
Affifi classifies Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as unexpressed pantheism. He opines that pantheism
permeated Ibn ʿArabī’s philosophy, yet remained unnamed due to his lack of philosophical
training.17 Affifi’s hypothesis has been largely discredited by scholarship over the years.18 The
fragility of this argument becomes evident upon taking into account the following aspects.
Sells, “Ibn 'Arabi's Polished Mirror”, 121.
Muḥy al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, ed. al-Sayyid Nizam al-Din Ahmad al-Lak'hanawi. 1st ed.
(Cairo: Maktabat Misr, 2015), 33.
16
Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence, (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and
Linguistic Studies, 1971), 37.
17
Meena Sharify-Funk, and William Rory Dickson. “Traces of Panentheism in Islam: Ibn Al-‘Arabi and
the Kaleidoscope of Being.” Panentheism across the World's Traditions, (2013): 144.
https://doi:10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199989898.003.0008.
18
Sharify-Funk, and Dickson, “Traces of Panentheism in Islam”, 144.
14
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Building on Chittick’s observation that the phrase waḥdat al-wujūd does not occur in Ibn
ʿArabī’s writings, Mahmoud al-Ghurab remarks that he located it in al-Futūḥāt in only one
instance as al-waḥda fī al-wujūd.19 Considering this single mention of al-waḥda fī al-wujūd in
light of the fact that al-Shaykh al-Akbar is a prolific writer and a unique master of language, it is
not farfetched to infer that his inclination towards not employing the term waḥdat al-wujūd was
deliberate. The single mention underpins that the expression occurred to al-Shaykh al-Akbar.
Therefore, the fact that the phrase waḥdat al-wujūd does not appear in his books, which are
moderately estimated at four hundred titles, cannot be due to an inability to arrive at this
expression. Whether the absence of the term is due to a conscious refraining on the part of Ibn
ʿArabī or any other reason, the absence in itself is meaningful. It presents sufficient purpose to
pay homage to Ibn ʿArabī’s legacy and identify an alternative terminology or description from
his own corpus, one which encompasses the essence of his conception of God and the world,
unity and multiplicity.
It is a daunting endeavor attempting to approach the subject of Being in the doctrine of
Ibn ʿArabī, a situation which al-Ghurab captures in his succinct statement about Unity of Being,
“Everyone who attempted to interpret it, rendered it more foreign”20. Ibn ʿArabī himself
acknowledges the complexity of the matter and says that “its unveiling is difficult”.21 The
intention, therefore, is to address the subject with reticence, by meeting it through al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s own words. Glimpses of secondary scholarship are incorporated for context and
background. Priority is lent to encountering the words of Ibn ʿArabī himself and observing the
images he employs in explaining the relationship between God and the world. As the title of this

al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya, 468.
( وأثبت الوحدة في الوجود و أنفها من الثبوت،)أثبِت الكثرة في الثبوت و انفِها من الوجود, See al-Futūḥāt, (1911), 2:502.
20
al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya, 468.
21
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1911), 2:70, quoted in al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya, 474.
19
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thesis suggests, the mirror metaphor has been identified as one of the most recurring and fitting
images al-Shaykh al-Akbar summons in his treatment of the subject of Being.
Being: God and the World
Ibn ʿArabī’s genius lies in his comfortability with paradoxes. His simultaneously
affirmative and negative answer to Ibn Rushd’s question is perhaps an archetypal moment of his
life, one that comes to mind again and again when reading his words. It is characteristic of
numerous of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s ideas to encompass both ‘yes and no’, ‘is and is not’, while
traversing and acknowledging with profoundness and insight the layers in between. His
conception of wujūd exemplifies the concomitance of opposites. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s treatment
of the story of prophet Yūsuf in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam captures the spirit of his eye for subtlety, as well
as the place of paradoxes and layers in his theory of wujūd. The gist of the story is as follows:
The young Yūsuf settles in the comfort of his father’s presence, and in the serenity of
their companionship, Yūsuf recounts his dream to him. Eleven planets, the sun, and the moon
prostrate themselves to him in a scene that is undoubtedly magnificent. In ancient Egypt some
years later, Yūsuf stands in a majestic hall; he seats his parents on the throne, and his eleven
brothers kneel before him. “This is the interpretation of my vision of long ago; my Lord has
made it true,” he says.22 Yūsuf postulates that his dream traversed the realm of imagination and
arrived as a manifest reality into the world of sensibles (al-maḥsūsāt). Ibn ʿArabī perceives a
veil, another layer in the fabric of this story. He recites the words, “people are asleep” (al-nās
niyām) attributed to prophet Muḥammad and posits them as the prophet’s response to Yūsuf,
which Ibn ʿArabī suggests to hold the discrepancy between Yūsuf’s level of awareness compared
to the prophet’s.23 Ibn ʿArabī explains that prophet Yūsuf could not see that standing in the grand

22
23

Quran, (12:100)
Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 130-131.
15

hall with his parents and kneeling siblings, Yūsuf was still within a dream. His previous dream as
a child was a dream within this dream.24 In Ibn ʿArabī’s view, Prophet Yūsuf’s awareness
mistook manifest reality for reality, rather than another layer of imagination. On the other hand,
the prophet’s words, “people are asleep” demonstrate his cognition of the imaginal nature of the
world.25
A staple feature of Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of God (al-Ḥaqq) in contrast with the
world, or what is conventionally called ‘anything other than God’ (mā siwā al-Ḥaqq), is their
relation to Being. For al-Shaykh al-Akbar, Being belongs to the domain of oneness, the realm of
the essence. It is one and the same as God.26 More precisely, it is one and the same as God’s
Essence (al-ḍhāt); this means that it does not occur elsewhere.27 Ibn ʿArabī writes, “Being is not
the entity (ʿayn) of the existent except in the right of al-Ḥaqq.”28 Unlike the divine names, which
manifest their effects on the canvas of creation and therefore bear the reality of multiplicity and
approachability, al- ḍhāt is unknown and unknowable to creation. By extension, Being is
unknown to creation.29 Designating the possible things (al-mumkināt) as existents is, according
to Ibn ʿArabī, “a metaphor not a reality”30. Rather existence, or Being per se, is an epithet in the
right of creation, not an intrinsic reality. A mirroring and reciprocity surface here in the relation
between God and creation, namely, what is Essence to al-Ḥaqq, i.e. al-wujūd, is an attribute in
al-khalq, and what is an attribute in al-Hāqq-the divine names- is the essence of al-khalq.31
Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 130-131.
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Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s position is clear when God and the world are contrasted on the
basis of Being; his writings propound a dichotomy between real and imaginal. It is significant to
unravel the layers of the current discussion. Chittick is critical of interpretations which present
Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of the cosmos as illusory, and deems them ‘shortsighted’.32 His
assessment is in full alignment with the purpose of this section. Many of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s
works are dedicated to emphasizing the modality of existence experienced by creation.33 The
dichotomy being addressed in this section does not explain the cosmos, or rather explain it away,
as an illusion. Rather it highlights one of the fundamental discrepancies Ibn ʿArabī establishes
between Being as it is God, and Being as it is experienced by the world. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar
writes, “Therefore, we said that the world, in juxtaposition to al-Ḥaqq, is of imagined Being and
nonexistent. And Being and the Existent is none but the essence of al-Ḥaqq.”34 In this quote, Ibn
ʿArabī reiterates the idea that only God is Being, and therefore, only He can be called the real
Existent. Words like ‘imagined’ (mutawahham), ‘imagination within imagination’ (khayālun fī
khayāl), ‘dream within a dream’ (manāmun fī manām) characterize the language Ibn ʿArabī
employs in making the distinction between God and the world.35
The dichotomy between real and imaginal enunciates their conspicuous discrepancies,
while simultaneously confirming a fundamental connection; as the imaginal is no more than the
image of the real.36 Ibn ʿArabī describes the world as a shadow (ḍhill), imagination (khayāl), and
mirror reflection. In a sense, these terms can be considered synonymous; the reflection in the
mirror is referred to in Arabic as both ḍhill fī al-mirʾāh and khayāl fī al-mirʾāh. The mirror not
Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 16.
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1985), 1:41; Muḥy al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, Naqsh al-fuṣūṣ, ed. al-Sayyid Nizam
al-Din Ahmad al-Lak'hanawi, (Cairo: Maktabat Misr, 2015), 441.
34
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only dominates Ibn ʿArabī’s metaphorical explanation of his theory of Being, it also
encompasses some of the alternative metaphors.
Arriving at the dichotomy of real and imaginal is born from contemplating the
trichotomy of Absolute/Necessary Existence, absolute nonexistence, and possible existence. Ibn
ʿArabī holds the possible things to be “entities: fixed from the manifestation of al-Ḥaqq,
nonexistent from the manifestation of nonexistence.”37 Between the two Absolutes of al-Ḥaqq
and nonexistence, the isthmus takes the form of the possible things. In this intermediary and
paradoxical position, the possible things appear on the surface of the mirror of nonexistence, and
reflect the image of Absolute Existence, while maintaining the qualities of absolute
nonexistence.
Nondelimited nothingness stands before nondelimited Being like a mirror. Within the
mirror, Being sees its own form. This form is the entity of the possible things. That is
why the possible thing has an immutable entity and a thingness in the state of
nonexistence, and that is why it comes out in the form of nondelimited Being. That also is
why it is qualified by infinity, and it is said concerning it that it is infinite. 38
He continues,
Likewise, nondelimited Being was also a mirror to nondelimited nothingness. In the
mirror of al-Ḥaqq, nondelimited nothingness saw itself. This form that it saw in the
mirror is the entity of nothingness, by which the possible thing is characterized. And it
[the possible thing] is described as infinite; similarly, nondelimited nothingness is
infinite. Therefore, the possible thing has the attribute of nonexistence. It is like the
manifest image between the seer and the mirror; it is neither the entity of the seer, nor
other than him. The possible thing, in respect to its entity, is neither the entity of al-Ḥaqq,
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1911), 3:48, quoted in al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya, 471.
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1911), 3:48, quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 205. In this
research, the term ‘Being’ is used to signify the essence of the divine, Being qua Being. Existence, on the
other hand, mostly refers to creation itself. In a few instances, it refers to Being as experienced in the rank
of possible existents.
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nor other than Him; and in respect to its nonexistence, is neither the entity of the
impossible, nor other than it.39
In this reciprocated witnessing, the seeing on both sides occurs through the possible
thing. The possible thing serves as a locus of manifestation, and by extension, a locus of
witnessing for both Being and nonexistence. In this intermediary position between Being and
nonexistence, the possible thing is lent its imaginal quality; it manifests the appearance of Being,
while residing on the surface of nothingness and certain annihilation. Similar to the ‘Russian
Doll-ness’ of the story of Yusuf’s dream, the imaginal’s fabric is layered and diverse, since both
the image (form) it reflects and the surface it reflects it on exhibit the attribute of
nondelimitation.40
Nondelimited nothingness is the mirror in which Being sees its form. Likewise, Being
acts as a mirror for Nondelimited nothingness and reflects its form to itself. The realm of forms
(images) is the realm of the possible things. As opposed to al-Ḥaqq whose Being is necessary
and the same as its essence, nonexistence has precedence in defining the possible thing’s
essence.41 This is not due to a temporal determination, referring to the possible thing’s state of
nonexistence preceding its state of existence. Rather, it is due to the possibility of the possible
thing’s nonexistence, an impossibility in the right of the Necessary Being.42 Since the possible
thing does not possess Being in its essence, Ibn ʿArabī calls it a manifestation (maẓhar).43 It is
the image in the mirror, manifesting the appearance of Being, while lacking it in its essence.
39

Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1911), 3:48, quoted in al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya, 470-471.
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The terms form and image are used interchangeably in this research. Mostly, image is given preference
over form, and form is included in the context of other scholars’ translations.
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We knew that the world is not the entity of the Real (ʿayn al-Ḥaqq), rather it is what
appeared in real existence (ma ẓahara fī al-wujūd al-ḥaqq). Were it the entity of al-Ḥaqq,
[the idea of] it being created would not be right (ma saḥ kawnahu badīʿan). Akin to how
the image of the seen occurs in the mirror; the onlooker looks into it [the mirror], and
through this looking, it is as if he created it [the image]… This image is not your entity,
for the quality of the mirror of smallness and largeness, length and width has a
determination (ḥukm) on the image, but it [the mirror image] has no determination over
you… The image is also not other than you, because of your determination over
it…Therefore, the seen is neither other than you, nor it is your entity. Likewise is the
matter regarding the existence of the world.44
When we saw that the mirror, through itself, has a determination over the image, and saw
that the onlooker differed from that image in some aspect, we knew that the onlooker, in
his essence, was unaffected by the entity of the mirror. Since he was unaffected, and since
that image was neither the entity of the mirror nor of the onlooker, but appeared due to
the determination/law (ḥukm) of manifesting to a mirror, we knew the difference between
the onlooker and the mirror, and the manifest image in the mirror, which is hidden
(ghayb) in it. Therefore, if the onlooker is seen going farther away from the mirror, he
sees the image getting farther into the mirror, and if he approaches it approaches. And if
the onlooker’s image was upright in the mirror and he raised his right hand, the image
raises its left hand. That is to apprise him that, even if I am your manifestation and in
your image, you are not me and I am not you. If you comprehend what we alerted you to,
you would know from where the servant was given the attribute of Existence (wujūd),
and who is the Existent (al-mawjūd), and from where he was given the attribute of
Nonexistence (al-ʿadam), and who is the Nonexistent (al-maʿdūm)... You would know
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who you are and who your Lord is, and where your rank is, and that you’re in need of
Him, Almighty, and He is The Rich, The Independent from you by His Essence. 45
An onlooker and a mirror, this configuration is Ibn ʿArabī’s answer to the question of
Being. A single spectator, and a myriad mirror reflections. Being what they are, reflections, the
images on the one hand are the spectator, since, even in their manyness, they reflect Him. On the
other hand, they are certainly not Him. They appear on the mirror in accordance with the
mirror’s capacity to reflect. They appear as many, when the onlooker is one. Most importantly,
the images only endure so long as He faces the mirror. Were He to turn His face away, the
images cease to be, while He persists. Paradox is at the heart of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology, and in
al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s writings, this paradox is metaphorized as a mirror.
The relationship between God and the world vis-a-vis existence has been given many
names and descriptions. “He is He” (Huwa Huwa) is a common and problematic depiction of this
relationship, which Souad al-Hakim regards as incompatible with Ibn ʿArabī’s views on Being.
Al-Hakim coins “He within Himself” (Huwa fī Huwa) as an alternative expression to circumvent
the pantheistic connotations of Huwa Huwa.46 However, al-Hakim’s expression propels the
argument out of the treacherous waters of pantheism and into that of panentheism. Early in their
article “Traces of Panentheism in Islam: Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Kaleidoscope of Being”, Meena
Sharify-Funk and William Rory Dickson declare that they do not classify Ibn ʿArabī as a
panentheist and acknowledge the limitations of this category. They, however, argue that
panentheism encompasses features of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s thought on Being better than the
earlier classification of pantheism did.47 While panentheism acknowledges the vastness of God
beyond the limits of the world, it remains an interpretation external to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. It
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1911), 4:316, quoted in al-Ghurab, Sharḥ kalimāt al-sufiyya, 475.
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could explain some aspects of his ideas, but it does not envelope the relations that govern and
connect his system of thought. In the following section, one of these relations is explored,
namely, Ibn ʿArabī’s concept of the image.
The Image
The concept of the image occupies a central position in Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology and
epistemology. It renders the existence of existents possible, and fulfills the ultimately
epistemological purpose of creation. The image defines a fundamental feature of the relationship
between God and the world, namely the world being created in the image of God. The famous
prophetic ḥadīth “God created Ādam in his image” receives special attention and unique
interpretations from Ibn ʿArabī. For al-Shaykh al-Akbar, the relation proposed in the ḥadīth
extends beyond man and includes the world as well. He explains that both the microcosm - manand the macrocosm -the world- are in the image of God.
As mentioned earlier, the realm of images is the realm of the possible things. Thus, by
definition, the image treads the space between existence and nonexistence. More precisely, the
image is the qualifying factor of the possible thing to be possible. “Know that it is unrightful that
something of the world, which has existence, would not be the image of al-Ḥaqq” 48 Where does
the image of al-Ḥaqq appear? On the surface of the mirror that is the world.
“Al-Ḥaqq, praise be to Him, had at first created the whole world as a sort of flat,
undifferentiated place, devoid of the [divine] spirit, like an unpolished mirror. But the
divine determination (ḥukm) would never do that without [making certain] that such a
place was able to receive the divine spirit to which [God’s] determination gives
expression by breathing into [that place].” 49
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As Ibn ʿArabī clarifies here, divine determination ruled that all possible existents must be
capable of receiving the divine spirit. This is the feature distinguishing possible from impossible
existence. Now, what is meant by the ability to receive the divine spirit?
It is the ability to be in the image, the ability to be a mirror. The capacity to be a mirror receptive
of the divine image is the defining characteristic of possible existence.
In a quote mentioned earlier, al-Shaykh al-Akbar alludes to nondelimited Being and
nondelimited nothingness standing opposite each other as mirrors. Nothingness acquires the
appearance of Being through standing empty in opposition of Being. The emptier (flatter and
more undifferentiated) nothingness is, the more it resembles a polished mirror; thus, the more it
reflects and resembles Being. Akin to a beam of light falling upon a reflective surface, the
surface in itself might be undifferentiated and empty, but the possession of a reflective quality
would allow it to take on the image of the beam of light and reflect it, displaying it to itself.
While nothing resides within the surface, this placement of opposition to infinite existence
creates on it images of infinite existence.
ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī alludes to this positioning of opposition in his work, Zubdat
al-Ḥaqāʾiq.
Every desired existent has a relation to the Necessary Existent, and the Necessary
Existent has a face to every existent. Every existent is present to the Necessary Existent,
and the Necessary Existent is distinct to every existent. Whatever is not present to the
Necessary Existent is nonexistent, since the Necessary Existent has no face to it. Had it
not been for the face of al-Qayyūm, existents would not have existence in the first
place.50
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Hamadānī‘s language is primarily philosophical, but when read in light of Ibn ʿArabī’s
writings, the resemblance of the mental image both quotes present becomes apparent. The
creator standing vis-a-vis creation, directing His face to it, is what lends creation its existence, an
identical situation to a person standing before a mirror, lending the image in it its contingent
existence.
Conclusion
From an expression unfound in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings, to a metaphor he ubiquitously
employed, the invitation is to reorient our point of departure when studying his conception of
Being. Izutsu gives the designation ‘transcendental consciousness’ to those capable of receiving
the reality of Being. This is a rare occurrence in individuals, rendering the words of those who
possess it invaluable treasures. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s unique ability at taming language has not
been neglected by scholarship. Shahab Ahmed references ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī’s evaluation of
the role Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas and language serve. al-Jīlī says, “Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas can save the
novice the difficulty of classifying and formulating the elusive mystical experiences and
symbolic visions that he encounters on the Sufi Path…because they give him a greater
conceptual clarity.”51
Being a frequent visitor of the realm of imagination, a wayfarer who has traversed this
path back and forth, Ibn ʿArabī has acquired or unveiled a familiarity with this realm. This
familiarity has not only made interpreting the subtleties of these travels possible for him, but it
has also made available the vocabulary for all those who succeeded him. His gift for words
transported aspects of the spiritual journey into the realm of language after formerly being
ineffable. Ibn ʿArabī alludes to this capacity as being a divine gift granted to him upon receiving
Alexander D. Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in
Medieval Islam, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 250, quoted in Shahab Ahmed,
What is Islam?, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 21.
51
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the station of the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood and says, “It was as if I was given the sum of
words” (wa kaʾannanī ʾutīt jawāmiʿ al-kalim).52 Considering the ripeness of al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s language and his copious writings, the motivation to contextualize his ideas through a
terminology external to his corpus is rather unjustified.
In al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s ontology, the predominant motif is a chasm, albeit layered and
mysterious, between real and imaginal, a relation he animates through the metaphor of the
mirror. The configuration of mirror and onlooker is recurrent, in some instances supplemented
with phrases insinuating the seriousness of the revelation. The mirror epitomizes the is/is not
concomitance characteristic of Ibn ʿArabī’s notion of Being and embodies the pillars of his
conception. It determines to whom actual Being belongs and whose Being is an image. And it
emphasizes the conditional and dependent nature of the image’s existence upon the existence of
God.
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——— Chapter 2 ———

The Image, The Mirror

“Where was your Lord before creating His (visible) Creation?”, the prophet was asked.
“He was in a Cloud, [ʿAmāʾ]; there was no space either above or below”53.
In this aloneness, hid a treasure wanting to be known. He created a creation capable of
knowing Him, and made His attributes knowable to them. The constitutions, amzija, of this
creation dictated a discrepancy in their capacities for knowing, and since like knows like, it was
necessary for the fulfillment of the initial purpose from creation to create an essence, jawhar,
very similar to that of the treasure, a perfect reality, which, through its own perfection, can know
Him through knowing itself.
Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ʿArabī, (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1969), 185.
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In the milieu of Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of the cosmos, three seminal themes
circumambulate his theories about the emergence of creation; these themes are perfection, love,
and knowledge. While al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s ideas are often deemed convoluted, one can only
express both bewilderment and awe at the intricacy of his theories and the precision of the
connections he weaves between them. The interconnections between knowledge, love, and
perfection are recurrent in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings, and the mirror metaphor is often concomitant to
them, whether explicitly used or implied. The claim of this chapter is that the presence of the
mirror in these foundational contexts is meaningful and worthy of analysis. The first chapter
addressed the mirror’s capacity at explaining the core principles of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology. It also
offered a glimpse at how the mirror is implied in contexts of ‘the image’, in the absence of the
mirror metaphor itself. This chapter further explores this idea of the image as the mirror through
addressing three interlocutors: perfection as a pursuit and an end in itself, love as the nature of
the initial creative movement, and knowledge as the purpose of creation.54 Within these three
focuses, Ibn ʿArabī’s employment of the mirror metaphor alternates between explicit mentions
and allusions through the guise of the image.
1.

The Image and Perfection
In Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, the image is a prerequisite for perfection, as well as for love and

knowledge. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s theory of Being bears upon and offers the core justification
for this conditionality. Since there is one Existent in whom the perfection of all attributesincluding the perfection of perfection- exists, any degree of perfection which appears in the
myriad manifestations, images, mirror reflections of this original Existent owes its presence to
Him. The more a manifestation clearly reflects the image of God, the more it exhibits His
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perfection in the world. And so, every perfection that Ibn ʿArabī sees in this world, he attributes
to the image of God.
Ibn ʿArabī writes in Inshāʾ al-dawāʾir that Allah commanded that the heavens and earth
be created, “to relieve them [the divine names] from the state they were in, from the lingering
and preoccupation of thought (taʿalluq al-khāṭir wa shughl al-bāl).”55 While the discomfort of
the divine names prior to the creation of the world is palpable in these lines, Ibn ʿArabī refutes
the understanding that the world emerged out of a divine need for it.56 He provides slightly
varying explanations in different contexts, but the defining character of his understanding of this
moment is essentially the same. In his perception, the core of the matter is love and perfection,
and he viewed the latter as a pursuit in itself.57 It is in response to the desire of existence and
knowledge to be complete and perfect that creation was commanded to emerge, al-Shaykh
al-Akbar explains in al-Futūḥāt.58 The perfection of knowledge as well as existence lies in them
being present in every possible reality capable of encapsulating them.
Ibn ʿArabī points to the world’s “love for witnessing itself as actual existence, as it
witnessed itself as a fixed entity.”59 Therefore, bringing potential existence into actual existence
achieved the pursuit of perfection, and the initial movement was one of love present in both God
and the world.60 God’s response for both knowledge and existence’s pursuit of perfection, his
response to the names’ desire to witness their manifestations in the world is evidence of the
divine preference for comfort, rāḥa.61 Perhaps the divine breath seminal to the moment of
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creation, referred to as al-nafkh, was a divine sigh of relief. For Ibn ʿArabī, perfection can be
present in the world and man, only because they are in the image of God.
1.1 The Image in the Macrocosm 62
“There is nothing in possibility more wondrous than what is.”63 The famous saying by
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī is mentioned favorably in several of Ibn ʿArabī’s books.64 However,
Ḥujjat al-Islām and al-Shaykh al-Akbar launch from distinct points of departure on the theory of
best of possible worlds. According to Ibn ʿArabī in his book Inshaʾ al-dawāʾir, Ghazālī justifies
his statement by proposing that had there been something more wondrous in possibility other
than what is, this would entail one of two meanings: The Creator did not create this more
wondrous creation due to either stinginess, deliberately preventing a better creation from
existing, or impotence, a lack of ability to create a more wondrous creation.65 Since both
interpretations negate the understanding of a Most Generous, All Powerful God, the hypothesis
they support must be false. Thus, “There is nothing in possibility more wondrous than what is.”
Ibn ʿArabī writes that while he observes the merits of this argument, the ‘most perfect’
rationale in support of the theory of best of possible worlds for him is: the image, which is
foundational to his thought at large and central to the various traditions and philosophies, which
address the doctrine of the Perfect Man. For al-Shaykh al-Akbar, this world is the best of
possible worlds because it was created in the image of God, as a manifestation of His Names.66
“The world is in the image of al-Ḥaqq, and the Perfect Man is in the image of the world
and the image of al-Ḥaqq, therefore, there is nothing more wondrous or perfect in
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possibility than this world, since, had there been [a more wondrous and perfect world in
possibility], there would have been what is more perfect than the image of al-Ḥaqq, and
there cannot be.” 67
The theory of best of possible worlds for him is supported by the constant concomitance
between perfection and the image.
Everything that has been brought into existence is in the image of al-Ḥaqq. Had it not
been in the image, it would not be in existence.68 However, as with several of al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s ideas, there are degrees and layers to the presence of the image in existence. Ibn
ʿArabī certainly does not suggest that every form of creation in isolation is in the image of God.
Rather, the collectivity of creation is potentially in the image; the world represents the
unpolished mirror, which, upon polishing, embodies the readiness for receiving the image. The
polishing of the mirror is the creation of the Perfect Man.
“The divine command necessitated the polishing of the mirror of the world, and Ādam is
the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form [the undifferentiated form of
creation].”69
1.2 The Image in the Microcosm
“Allah created Ādam in His image.”70
The significance of the image heightens and intensifies in the case of man. Ibn ʿArabī
clarifies the intention from the image ḥadīth. He addresses the common interpretation that Ādam,
as mentioned in the ḥadīth, is a reference to the entirety of mankind being created in the image of
al-Ḥaqq.71 Al-Shaykh al-Akbar, however, teaches that the truth of the matter is that only a select
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few humans are meant by this ḥadīth. The meanings and implications of the image ḥadīth are
explored in further depth in the third section of this chapter entitled The Image and Knowledge.
The focus of this section is to observe the contexts in which the image, and by extension the
mirror, occurs in relation to perfection.
“Adam was perfected only through the divine names.”72 Being created in the image of
God’s names fulfilled the perfection of Ādam. Considering the variations of the image ḥadīth
aids in contextualizing the image in which Ādam was created. The ḥadīth is mentioned with
three variations, substituting the divine name Allah with al-Ḥaqq in some instances and
al-Raḥmān in others.73 It is conceivable that these divine names are specifically used because of
the generality and universality they depict, a more inclusive domain upon creation, Allāh being
the all-encompassing divine name. However, Ibn ʿArabī elaborates on the specific meanings of
the names al-Raḥmān and al-Ḥaqq in relation to the image.
In what could be considered his exegesis of al-Fātiḥa, Ibn ʿArabī gives a theological
explanation to the name al-Raḥmān as part of al-Basmala, the very first verse of al-Fātiḥa and
the customary opening to almost all sūrahs of the Qurʾan. He writes that there are two ways the
name can be regarded in “Bismillah al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm”, either as a reference to the Essence,
al-ḍhāt, if it is grammatically considered a substitute (badal) to the name Allah, or as a reference
to a divine attribute, if considered an adjective, ṣifa.74 If the name al-Raḥmān is a designation to
the essence, then the two variations of the image ḥadīth, where the names Allah and al-Raḥmān
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are employed, would be equivalent in significance. He cites the following Qurʾanic verse from
sūrat al-ʾIsrāʾ, and writes in commentary, “thus making them two names for the essence.”75
“Say: 'Call upon God, or call upon the Merciful; whichsoever you call upon, to Him
belong the Names Most Beautiful.' And be thou not loud in thy prayer, nor hushed
therein, but seek thou for a way between that.”76
Nevertheless, Ibn ʿArabī acknowledges that the image ḥadīth formulation with the name
al-Raḥmān might not be authentic through the standard methodologies of ḥadīth transmission; it
is, however, authentic through kashf. 77
The significance of employing the divine name al-Raḥmān in the image ḥadīth resides in
its allusion to a duty specific to the perfect man’s servanthood. “Man to the Real is in the rank of
the pupil of the eye (insān al-ʿayn), to the eye; therefore, he was named insān. By him, the Real
looked upon His creation, and therefore, Had mercy upon them.”78 Ibn ʿArabī uses the generic
term insān in this quote and elsewhere, but it can be gleaned from the wider context that it is the
perfect man he is concerned with. Al-Shaykh al Akbar compares the perfect man, who is created
in the image of al-Raḥmān, to the animal man, who only shares the physical appearance with the
perfect man but inherits of the divine image only what his humanity, his constitution, allows.
Through the comparison, he acknowledges that the Perfect Man is “the perfect image and the
perfect state.” 79 In a different excerpt, the influence of the name al-Raḥmān comes to the
foreground as Ibn ʿArabī explains that the most vicious of creatures is the animal man, and the
most merciful among creatures is the Perfect Man.80 It is commonsensical that a Perfect Man,
who is the embodiment of all virtues, would possess infinite mercy as one of these virtues.
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However, the specific mention of the virtue of mercy is an indication to the Perfect Man being
created in the image of al-Raḥmān.
This allusion becomes more explicit in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s words on the Muḥammadan
reality.81According to Ibn ʿArabī as well as mainstream sunnī scholars, al-Ḥaqīqā
al-Muḥammadiyya, also referred to as the Muḥammadan Light and the First Intellect, is the first
reality to emerge from God’s knowledge into existence. He writes that the first reality to be
bestowed with existence is al-Ḥaqīqā al-Muḥahmadīyya al-Raḥmānīyya, emerging from the
Divine Name, al-Raḥmān.82 This reality, which is characterized by mercy, is the simple essence
(jawhar) from which all subsequent creation ensued. Consequently, mercy becomes an inherent
component of creation at large.83 The perfect man’s creation in the image of al-Raḥmān is the
gateway for mercy to exist in the world.
Concerning the employment of the divine name al-Ḥaqq in the image ḥadīth, it harbors
the tenets of Ibn ʿArabī’s cosmogony and the order and ranks of the emergence of creation.
Essentially, this constellation epitomizes the notion of the perfect man being the primary
intention, and the last manifestation, a key notion which Ibn ʿArabī reiterates in various forms.
Ibn ʿArabī perceives an identification between the Real (al-ḥaqq al-makhlūq bihī) and the divine
Breath, from which creation emerged.84 “Hence, the Breath has the property of the Nonmanifest,
but when it becomes manifest it represents the property of the Manifest. So it is the First in the
Nonmanifest and the last in the Manifest.85” The name al-Ḥaqq, therefore, alludes to the creation
of the perfect man and his rank.
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Ibn ʿArabī demonstrates an inherent distinction between the creation of man and the
creation of the world, about which he writes, “The difference between man and the world is akin
to the difference between existence and non-existence.”86 This difference owes to the following
notions.
“The realities that Allah had gathered in Man were dispersed in the world, so al-Ḥaqq
called them from all of the world, and they gathered. From their gathering came man.”87
“The whole world emerged from nonexistence into existence, except for Man alone, who
appeared from existence into existence, from dispersed existence into gathered, collective
existence”88

There is a recurrent theme here regarding Ibn ʿArabī’s notion of the order of emergence
and the ranks of creation. While al-Ḥaqīqā al-Muḥammadīyya is the first and most perfect
emergent and the jawhar from which all subsequent creation emerged, it appears as a corporeal
reality in the last prophet. Ibn ʿArabī recites the prophetic ḥadīth, “I was a prophet when Ādam
was between water and clay.”89 This configuration is paralleled here, where man, while being the
very purpose of the emergence of the world, is the last to appear as a manifest reality. Launching
from this point, one interpretation to the first line of al-Futūḥāt can be ventured.
Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s magnum opus begins with the following preamble. “Praise be to
Allah, who brought things into existence from a state of nonexistent, and its nonexistence.”90 Ibn
ʿArabī uses the term things (al-ashyāʾ), which could refer to both macrocosm-the world-and
al-Ghurab, al-Insān al-kāmil, 8.
al-Ghurab,al-Insān al-kāmil, 7.
88
al-Ghurab, al-Insān al-kāmil, 8. Ibn ʿArabī often uses the term ‘man’ in contexts which evidently
address the Perfect Man. This, however, hardly confounds the reader, as Ibn ʿArabī’s cosmogony provides
a stark distinction between the rank and cosmological significance of the animal man and the Perfect
Man.
89
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1985), 2:171.
90
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1985), 1:41. (")"الحمد هلل الذي أوجد األشياء عن َعد ٍَم و َع َد ِمه
86
87

34

microcosm-man. One possible reading of the lines is that the first ʿadam refers to the creation of
the macrocosm. God brought the macrocosm into existence from a state of non-existence. The
quote mentioned previous to this opening line conveys that man is the amalgamation of creation,
and thus, man became a manifest reality succeeding it. Hence, the second ʿadam. The double
negation means an affirmation; the non-existence of non-existence is existence, (ʿadam al-ʿadam
wujūd).91 Thus, the second ʿadam is in reference to the microcosm and the creation of man, who
emerged from an initial existence as everything in creation dispersed, into existence as the
epitome of the whole of creation. Through this reading, this preamble could be phrased as,
“Praise be to Allah who brought the macrocosm into existence after being in a state of
nonexistence, and brought the microcosm from the nonexistence of nonexistence, i.e. existence
[of the macrocosm]”.
The question arises of what this reveals about the constellation of al-Ḥaqq, perfection,
and the image? Ibn ʿArabī’s answer lies in the ranks of existents in relation to their share of the
image.
“The world is in the image of al-Ḥaqq, and the perfect man is in the image of the world
and al-Ḥaqq.”92
“The perfect man is the one created in the divine image, thus, he is the truth, al-Ḥaqq, by
which creation was created, meaning that it is because of him that the world was created.
The perfect man is the most complete/perfect of existents; he is the end. Since the end is
the aim of the creation preceding it, this preceding creation was not created except for
this end and the manifestation of its essence.”93
Souad al-Hakim, al-Muʿjam al-sufī: al-ḥikma fī ḥudūd al-kalima, (Beirut: Dandara: 1981), 785. For
al-Hakim, ʿadam al-ʿadam is an allusion to the existence (wujūd) of the fixed entities in God’s
knowledge. The line, thus, signifies the emergence of the world from an epistemic existence (wujūd ʿilmī)
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One ponders the words of Ibn ʿArabī and Materia Prima, Anima Mundi, and
Philosopher’s Stone come to mind. al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s words, “The perfect man is the one
created in the divine image, thus, he is the truth, al-Ḥaqq, by which creation was created” convey
the image of the perfect man being Materia Prima- al-Ḥaqq in this context, also al-Ḥaqīqā
al-Muḥammadīyya- by which the world was created. He is thus comparable to the Anima Mundi,
the soul animating through the world.94 However, the rest of the paragraph delivers the obverse
meaning, creation becomes Materia Prima, and man its epitome and perfection, its Philosopher’s
stone. An inclusive reading of both configurations recapitulates Ibn ʿArabī‘s overall conception
of the theory of the perfect man, who is the initial intention, and the last manifestation.
“The power of every existent in the world is found in man, thus, he potentially possesses
every rank. Therefore, the image is unique to him alone (ikhtaṣ waḥdahū bī al-ṣūrā). He
combined divine realities, which are the names, and realities of the world. For he is the
last existent (fa ʾinahū ākhir mawjūd)... Everything except for man is creation, only man
is creation, (khalq), and Ḥaqq.”
What is the significance of man being created in the image of al-Ḥaqq? The rhyming
terms, khalq and Ḥaqq, are frequently juxtaposed and contrasted in Ibn ʿArabī’s writing, as well
as in the Quran. There is a conspicuous opposition between the two terms, and consequently, the
two realms they denote. And as Ibn ʿArabī often poetically explains, between any two opposites,
an isthmus must exist.
As mentioned earlier, the image ḥadīth is often interpreted as referring to the generic man
being in the image of God, which Ibn ʿArabī denies and refuses. Since the perfect man shares the
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outward appearance of the animal man, an obvious indication of the facet of his nature reflecting
khalq, the ḥadīth accentuates the inner image that he was bestowed, the second facet of his
nature, reflecting the Creator, al-Ḥaqq.
The narration of the image ḥadīth mentioning the name al-Raḥman alludes to the role of
Perfect Man as an isthmus of mercy and knowledge between God and creation. And the narration
employing the name al-Ḥaqq refers to the perfect man’s rank as the first nonmanifet reality, and
the last reality to materialize.
“Man to the Real is in the rank of the pupil of the eye (insān al-ʿayn), to the eye;
therefore, he was named insān. By him, the Real looked upon His creation, and therefore,
Had mercy upon them.”95
Man is al-Raḥman’s, al-Ḥaqq’s means of vision, a role that is isthmoid in function. It can
be imagined as the meeting point of two opposite triangles, one is pointing downwards, the other
upwards.

The perfect man, as the image of God and creation, reflects God to Himself and to
creation, and reflects creation to itself and to God. Through Man as a means of vision and a
reflective surface, God witnesses Himself in a manner that reveals His mystery to Him.
Simultaneously, He witnesses creation in Man, and through this witnessing, He extends His
mercy upon them. These are the events transpiring in the upper triangle. In the lower triangle,
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since Man is the amalgamation and epitome of all of creation, creation witnesses its perfection
and wholeness in Man, while also witnessing a glimpse of divinity, a manifested reflection of
God in him. The perfect man is a locus of witnessing of self and other for both above, al-Ḥaqq,
and below, al-khalq.
2.

The Image and Love
The theme of knowledge stands at the heart of the moment of creation. Some scholars

read love, others read sadness as the dominant emotion animating this moment. But while the
emotion might be disputed, the motive expressed through the emotion is the same, a divine
desire to be known.
“I was a treasure but was not known. So I loved to be known, and I created the creatures
and made Myself known to them. Then they came to know me.”96
The abundant references to the Treasure ḥadīth in both primary and secondary
scholarship lend it the centrality of a backbone to a plethora of sufi ideas. However, it does not
appear in al-Futūḥāt until the twelfth volume.97 Ibn ʿArabī considers the language of the ḥadīth
where love for being known stands out as the primordial divine motive. Two of the themes
pointed out earlier are commingled in the Treasure ḥadīth, knowledge and love. There is a secret,
a state of occultation expressed in the ḥadīth Qudsī of the Treasure. This secrecy implies an
incomplete knowledge. A secret or an entity in hiding, by nature, is simultaneously known and
unknown. The secret is known to its keeper, the entity is known to itself, and unknown, but
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 66.
Jonathan Brown in his book ‘Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World’ relays
the contention around the Treasure ḥadīth’s authenticity. This claim was addressed to Ibn ʿArabī, to which
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origin. Therefore, this observation of the sporadic mention of this ḥadīth in al-Futūḥāt is significant. The
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contingently knowable, to all else. God’s knowledge of Himself was fulfilled, but He was not
known to an ‘other’, capable of knowing Him.
There is coherence to Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of the world, physical and
metaphysical. It is characterized by an underlying structure resembling sound echoes, or mirror
reflections, in other words, varied manifestations of a single reality. A prophet can be connected
to a word, a specific divine name, a letter, a planet, a feminine or masculine archetype.98 This
amalgamation of connections manifests itself in the life events of this prophet and his role in the
world. They also manifest in the person and life of the inheritor, wārith, of this prophet.
Therefore, one method that Ibn ʿArabī adopts in explaining his ideas is to return to the original
reality, from which subsequent manifestations ensue.
An example of this is his understanding of motivation. He explains that every movement
is essentially in reality a movement of love, since the initial movement, from which creation
resulted, was a movement of love, ḥaraka ḥubīyya.99 Had God not loved to be known, creation
would not have been given the command to be. From this initial loving movement, every
consequent movement arises, carrying the same quality of love.
The juxtaposition of love and knowledge in the Treasure ḥadīth represents one of Ibn
ʿArabī’s fundamental ideas, a ‘universal law’ determining the possibility of a certain occurrence.
This law is the law of correspondence. For Ibn ʿArabī, a correspondence must occur between
knower and known in order for knowledge to occur.100 The same law governs the possibility of
the occurrence of love.

These connections are found scattered in the different sources. For instance, in al-Futūḥāt, Ibn ʿArabī
refers to Ādam being a manifestation of the word, ‘Bism’, from the opening verse of the Qur’an, as it is
with him that creation of humankind began. He is also the resident of the first heaven (the moon).
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Ibn ʿArabī writes that natural love occurs when there is an interlocking between two
realities, when the image occurring in the imagination of the lover matches the reality of the
beloved, that they- the imagined image and the reality- become indistinguishable.101 This
matching does not necessarily mean a complete identicality between lover’s imagination and
beloved’s reality, but rather a correspondence in meaning.
“Meanings are different from the words and letters [that comprise them], but the word
indicates the meaning by way of correspondence; so that if the meaning is embodied, it
would not exceed the quantity of the word. The like of this sort is called love”.102
And such is the case with the emergence of creation. The divine names and their
manifestations in the world correspond with each other in utter precision.103 Similar to the
distinction between a word and its meaning, a divine name is not its manifestation, but it is
accurately represented by it in meaning. This correspondence is the sign of the interlocking of
love.104 While the metaphor is unuttered, Ibn ʿArabī’s words imply a mirror. The occurrence of
love necessitates that the reality and its image correspond with utter precision. Therefore, the
connection between God and the world is one of love, as the world -the image- corresponds
precisely with the divine names -the reality- which it manifests.105 In the same way that love
precedes knowledge in the language of the Treasure ḥadīth, it precedes it in defining the relation
between Creator and creation. Whether we follow the progression of Ibn ʿArabī’s argument or
backtrack the conclusions to arrive at the initial context, a mirror seems to be implied. The initial
movement being one of love signifies a correspondence between the image as occurring in the
101
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lover’s imagination, and the reality of the beloved. And the divine names’ correspondence with
the world ascertains an interlocking of love between creator and creation.
The state of occultation of the Treasure was willed into cessation by the motivation of
love. The Treasure wanted to be known, the divine names wanted a domain upon which to
express their dominion, God wanted to see His essence in a comprehensive entity, which reveals
His secret, His mystery to Himself.106
3.

The Image and Knowledge
“I was a treasure but was not known. So I loved to be known, and I created the creatures
and made Myself known to them. Then they came to know me.”107
The initial loving movement was a movement in the direction of knowledge. The

Treasure ḥadīth presents knowledge as the purpose of creation, a launching point that determines
the meaning, nature, and function of this creation for Ibn ʿArabī. The entanglement of love and
knowledge continues and the image is the connective thread. As was discussed in the previous
section, the interlocking of love between God and the world implies a mirror, and the occurrence
of knowledge of God in the world necessitates it.
Ibn ʿArabī elaborates on the notion of knowledge being the purpose of creation through a
concise opuscule with which he ends his treatise Inshāʾ al-dawāʾir. He explains that the divine
names contemplate themselves and arrive at the realization that “they hold in their hands the
reins of the heavens and earth, when there were no heavens and no earth.”108 According to Ibn
ʿArabī, the divine names assign these designations, heavens and earth, to these plains yet to be
created. In this primordial moment, the reality of opposition was brought to the foreground; a
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reality, which reflects the oppositions present among the divine names. As the names al-ʾAwwal,
al-Nafiʿ, al-Muḥyy stand in semantic, and effectual, opposition with al-ʾĀkhir, al-Ḍār, al-Mumīt,
the heavens stand opposite the earth, embodying further oppositions, such as singular and plural,
and above and below. While being in the domain of the names already means being in the
domain of multiplicity, opposition augments the profoundness and character of this multiplicity;
it seizes to indicate mere manyness, rather a paradoxical manyness, which, hypothetically, would
be difficult to encompass all at once.
The names, in their conversation in Inshāʾ al-dawāʾir, realize that they own keys to locks
nonexistent, and so a demand for their existence arose. The names raise the matter to the seven
leading divine names: al-Ḥayy, al-ʿAlīm, al-Murīd, al-Qāʾil, al-Qādir, al-Jawwād, and al-Muqṣit,
who in turn, raise it to the leader of the leading divine names, the name Allah. They request that
“the heavens and earth exist, so they can place every key (miqlād) on its door.”109 The concerned
names were delegated by the name Allah to act upon their domains in order to grant the divine
names their request. The delegation and assigning of roles undertaken by the name Allah in the
creation of the world, as well as the allusion to opposition mentioned earlier, exemplifies the
completion of God’s knowledge of Himself. The names - God’s attributes- knew the distinct
nature of each name and by extension, the unique abilities of each of them. And so creation did
not arise from a divine epistemic destitution, a divine need for self-knowledge; it rather emerged
to manifest God’s names and attributes, so that He may witness Himself and be known by an
other.110
Ibn ʿArabī writes, “Allah Almighty knew Himself, hence, He knew the world.” 111 In
contemplating Himself, God witnessed His names, and knowing the realities of the names The
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Creator, the Most Merciful, the Most Powerful, He knew the possibility existed for an object
upon which His names can manifest their being and exhibit their effect.112 If He is the Creator,
then there can possibly be a creation. And it is of His supreme omnipotence to bring forth into
existence every thing which can potentially exist. His knowledge of Himself included within it
knowledge of the world. The names’ intrigue with the keys they were entrusted is a curiosity
towards the names’ effects. 113 Perhaps one can say a desire for the divine order Kun to pass
through each one of the divine names as a beam of light and reflect their reality upon the surface
of creation.
Worthy of mention is the fact that Ibn ʿArabī explicitly affirms the completion and
perfection of God’s knowledge of Himself in his writings.114 He lucidly explains it in the chapter
on Mūsā in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, a nexus where knowledge, love, and perfection coalesce.
Knowledge was complete in the Necessary Existent, wājib al-wujūd, but absent from contingent
existence, al-wujūd al-muḥdath, due to the absence of the latter itself. Since contingent existence
was possible and potentially capable of receiving knowledge, the ultimate perfection of
knowledge necessitates that knowledge occurs in contingent existence as well. Perfection
necessitates that knowledge be present in all forms of existence capable of knowing, the Eternal,
al-Qadīm, and the created, al-muḥdath.115

This statement does not imply a temporal chasm preceding God’s knowledge of Himself. It is
elucidating the ideas of Ibn ʿArabī as explained through the conversation between the names.
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3.1 Witnessing vs. Knowing
When al-Ḥaqq, Exalted is He, wanted, through His countless beautiful names, to see
them/their entities (aʿyanaha)116, and if you will you could say, to see Himself (ʿaynahu)
in an all-encompassing being (kawn jāmiʿ), who embraces the whole matter, by way of
exhibiting the attribute of existence, and through whom God’s mystery would be revealed
to Him. Because something seeing itself in itself, is not the same as seeing itself in
something else, that would be as a mirror to it. It appears to itself in an image given by
the seen entity- the witnessed locus- in a way that did not appear to it without the
existence or manifestation of this locus.117
These lines comprise the introduction of the first chapter of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. They beckon
the question of God’s knowledge of Himself and whether a creation is required to complement
this knowledge. As mentioned earlier, Ibn ʿArabī refutes the reliance of God’s knowledge of
Himself upon the created world. A closer reading of the lines from Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam shows that
the motive emphasized in the quote is witnessing, as opposed to the motive of knowing found in
the Treasure ḥadīth. Ibn ʿArabī explains that something witnessing itself in something else
allows it to see itself in a way that would not be possible for it otherwise. In these opening lines,
Ibn ʿArabī solely refers to acts of seeing rather than knowing. Contextualizing both motives,
witnessing and knowing, reveals that the objects recipient of them are God and the world
respectively. Through the world, God becomes the recipient of witnessing Himself, and the
world becomes the recipient of knowledge of God.
Qāshānī offers an interpretation in his commentary on Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam to define the
ramifications each mode of seeing entails. He explains that in the absence of a mirror, the seeing
which occurs achieves and is limited to awareness and knowledge (ruʾyah ʿilmīyya). While in the
To see the manifestation of the realities contained within the knowledge (al-ḥaḍra al-ʿilmiyya) of the
names.
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presence of the mirror, i.e. the locus of manifestation, the seeing achieves both knowledge,
(ruʾyah ʿilmīyya), as well as witnessing (ruʾyah ʿaynīyya).118 God’s knowledge of Himself is,
therefore, unaffected by the absence of the mirror. For the current purposes, suffice to note that
the Treasure ḥadīth holds a moment of connection over knowledge between God and creation,
while the introductory lines from Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam hold a moment of connection over witnessing
between God and Himself.
3.2 The Image Possibilizing Knowledge
While knowledge, akin to rain, might fall equally on a piece of land, the land’s
topography determines the share of rainwater it could encompass. A mountain would preserve
substantially less water than a valley; similarly, existents, being of different constitutions
(amzija) have different capacities for encompassing knowledge. Considering these differing
constitutions, the nature of the creation most capable of receiving knowledge of the divine
becomes a question. The law of correspondence epitomizes al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s answer. A
maxim can be derived from Ibn ʿArabī’s writings: only through similarity is knowledge possible.
“When Allah loved to be known, it was not possible for Him to be known except by he
who is in His image, and Allah did not bring into existence anyone in His image except
for the Perfect Man.” 119
Abd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī recounts an anecdote about a disillusioned scholar known for
his obstinacy demanding that the former provide an explanation for the first line of al-Futūḥāt.120
Shaʿrānī responded to the request with an advice to the scholar to follow a Shaykh, only then
could he acquire spiritual tasting, ḍhawq, and be open to the meaning of these words. The
possibility of acquiring knowledge remains conditional in Ibn ʿArabī’s view. This conditionality
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is exemplified by the aforementioned quote. The quote signifies that the possibility of knowledge
and the extent to which it is possible depend upon the potential knower. Something has to occur
and be present within the potential knower, which elevates him to be a knower in actuality. This
thing is: resemblance to the object of knowledge.
This notion is ubiquitous in Ibn ʿArabī’s corpus. The following excerpts reveal the varied
contexts where it appears, and consequently, its deep rootedness in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought at large.
In the first volume of al-Futūḥāt, Ibn ʿArabī narrates the story of a meaningful encounter
between him and a person he calls, al-fatā, the young man. Ibn ʿArabī commences to disclose
some of the mysteries of knowledge revealed to him. He informs al-fatā that the reason why this
knowledge was accessible to him is due to the nature of his reality.121
“Had it not been for what God has entrusted in my reality, of what it required, and [had it
not been for] what my path arrived at, I would not have found attainment of this spring,
or an inclination to this knowledge. Therefore, I always return to myself in the end.” 122
An excerpt which further illustrates Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine of correspondence is found in
Kitāb al-mwāzana li khatm al-wilāyā al-Muḥammadīyya, where he propounds an uncommon
reading of the experience of Hellfire. He explains that for one to experience the burning in
hellfire, they have to have started and propagated a fire within themselves first. A hell needs to
be already present within them. A correspondence to Hellfire, the outside, has to exist within
their scope of known experience, their inside, for the burning to befall them.
You do not burn by an outside fire, but by a fire you have ignited yourself, and no one
extinguishes it but you, and no one kindles it but you. So abandon that which gives you
the illusion that the fire is somewhere, and he who’s tormented is thrown into it. If you
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are, for instance, thrown in the fire, and you have already extinguished your fire, you
would not burn. You know there are angels in the fire; how do they not burn? 123
If within the person, the fire was extinguished with the elements that Ibn ʿArabī specifies:
the waters of certitude (yaqīn), asceticism (zuhd), and dependence upon God (tawakkul), the
torment of Hellfire would have been unrecognizable, and ineffectual on them.124
While one can hypothetically summon, by virtue of imagination, a faint glimpse of the
feelings of pain associated with a broken bone, or an amputated limb, only a person who has
experienced these misfortunes can fully know and describe the pain. While a person can read
about the spiritual ascensions (maʿārij) of al-Shaykh al-Akbar, only someone whose spiritual
standing resembles that of Ibn ʿArabī’s can arrive at the profundity of these spiritual experiences.
Ibn ʿArabī implies in the aforementioned quote that resemblance is a prerequisite for knowledge,
to put it in familiar and resonant terms, like knows like. And nothing resembles one more than
their own image in the mirror.
“Know that mirrors are diverse in shape and that they modify the object seen by the
observer according to their own shapes, whether they be tall, wide, curved, bent, round,
small, large, numerous, and so on- whatever may be given by the shape of the mirror.”125
Herein lies the polarity of a mirror. Even though a mirror intrinsically is a surface of
emptiness with a readiness for containing the image of the entity standing before it, mirrors
themselves are of varied attributes. These attributes alter and determine the experience of the
onlooker. Thus, an imperfect mirror can be deceptive, a flaw which nullifies the mirror and its
basic function.
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Ibn ʿArabī uses the mirror symbolism here to explain the notion of mizāj, constitution.126
According to him, creatures, like mirrors, are created in different constitutions. This becomes
evident upon considering people’s varying capacities of faith and rational contemplation. The
constitution of a person determines the quality and nature of their mirror, consequently, their
share of the image. A constitution which comprises an unpolished, bent, large, or small mirror
will reflect an inaccurate approximation of the image of the onlooker. Following the same vein of
logic, a constitution which forms a perfect mirror will be the reflection of the image par
excellence. The perfection of the mirror is, therefore, incumbent for the fulfillment of both
primordial motives, witnessing and knowing. There must exist a perfect mirror for al-Ḥaqq to
witness His image in al-khalq, and for al-khalq to unveil the knowledge of al-Ḥaqq.
3.3 Constitution127
“The divine command necessitated the polishing of the mirror of the world, and Ādam is
the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form [the undifferentiated form of
creation].”128
Ibn ʿArabī writes in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam that Ādam was the exact polishing of the mirror of
creation. Thus, he implies a distinctive quality to the reality of Ādam, which was absent from the
world before his creation. Attention is paid here to what in Ādam’s constitution qualified him to
be the polishing of the mirror, and thus, in the image.
The Quranic myth of creation and Ibn ʿArabī’s treatment of the creation of Ādam
demonstrate the station and metaphysical meaning of the first man and prophet. In doing so, they
allude to the nature of his constitution, and what ensues from it. The quranic narrative begins
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with God informing the angels that He will create a vicegerent on earth. The information is met
with dispute on the side of the angels, and a questioning of the purposefulness of a creation,
which they claimed would bring about corruption and bloodshed.129 Ibn ʿArabī proposes that the
angels’ prejudice against this new creation is the product of what is found in their own nature.
They assumed the new creation would cause chaos, a chaos which al-Shaykh al-Akbar explains
to mean precisely dispute and conflict, which characterize the angels’ response upon receiving
the information. Their assumption was dispute and conflict, because dispute and conflict were of
their nature, as is evidenced with their response to God.130 Their constitution dictated their
understanding and expectations. According to Ibn ʿArabī, the angels “were veiled by their own
essences.”131 They believed that they possessed the aptitude for the highest ranks, and
consequently, they believed that their acts of worship and glorification of God were sufficient.132
The pivotal moment unfolds through this Quranic verse, “And He taught Adam the
names, all of them; then He presented them unto the angels and said, ´Now tell Me the names of
these, if you speak truly´.”133 The Quranic verse does not explicitly identify ‘the names’ as the
Divine Names, but Ibn ʿArabī’s conclusions from this verse, as explained in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam,
definitively establish his belief that they are indeed the Divine Names. He contrasts Ādam’s
knowledge of all Divine Names, and his ability to name them, to the angels’ ignorance of the
existence of the names altogether.134 The verse treads the line between the literal and the
figurative. The Divine Names being presented before the angels and Ādam suggests a visible
manifestation of the names’ realities. Abd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾrī elaborates on the nature of this
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manifestation in his book al-Mawāqif fī al-waʿẓ wal-ʾirshād. He writes that Ādam was presented
with the fixed entities, which are “the realities of external things”.135 He knew which names
corresponded to -and by extension governed- which fixed entities, through his knowledge of the
differences in the names’ effects. In this understanding, Ādam witnessed the world, the whole of
creation, in the form of fixed entities.136
The moment of the manifestation evoked a knowledge and recognition in Ādam, and a
sense of diminution in the angels, upon becoming perceptive of the destitution of their
knowledge.137 Ādam’s knowledge of the names is an event of tremendous meaning. To reiterate a
key focus of this research, knowledge is only possible when a correspondence occurs between
the knower and the object of knowledge.
“When Allah loved to be known, it was not possible for Him to be known except by he
who is in His image, and Allah did not bring into existence anyone in His image except
for the Perfect Man.” 138

Ibn ʿArabī writes, “Ādam was given the knowledge of the Names in the origins of his
foundation. He was created in this way.”139 Ādam could only know God’s Names because of a
correspondence in meaning between the names and ‘the origins of his foundation’.140 This
correspondence rendered Ādam a polished mirror, with a readiness for reflecting the Divine
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Names. Ādam knew the Names through seeing them reflected in himself. For Ibn ʿArabī, this
seminal event is the definition of the ḥadīth, “Ādam was created in the image of God”. The
creation of Ādam marks both completion and commencement. His creation accomplishes the
original purpose, knowledge of God, through knowledge of His Names. Simultaneously, the
chain of human existence, vicegerency, and perfection launches with him. All of these roles were
only possible for Ādam because he was created in the image of God; he was a polished mirror.
“Adam only acquired perfection through [the knowledge of] the Divine Names”141
The purposefulness of the creation of Man is evident in the Quran and, therefore, in the
Akbarian thought. In fulfillment of God’s love for being known, a creation emerged. Since it was
love that inspired this initial movement, an interlocking occurred between creation as was
imagined- perhaps imaged- by the Creator, and creation as it manifested; an interlocking which
established a correspondence in meaning between the divine names and their manifested
realities. This creation was a mirror to the multiplicity of the divine, and thus, was an incomplete
reflection. Therefore,..
Al-Ḥaqq, praise be to Him, wanted, through His most beautiful names which are
innumerable, to see the essences (aʿyan) of the names-- or, if you will, to see Himself [or
His ʿayn, essence]. He wished to do this through an all encompassing being (kawn jāmiʿ)
who embraces the whole matter: a being which embodies the attribute of existence.
Through this being, God’s secret would then be revealed to Himself. 142
This encompassing being is Man.
“The realities that Allah had gathered in Man were dispersed in the world, so the Real
called them from all of the world, and they gathered. From their gathering Man came.” 143
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The epitome of this all encompassing being is the Perfect Man. Thus, he is the mirror of
both the multiplicity and unicity of the divine. Juxtaposing ḥadīths which are prominent in
al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s writings along with his own explanations demonstrates the Akbarian
understanding of the purpose of creation.
“I was a treasure but was not known. So I loved to be known, and I created the
creatures and made Myself known to them. Then they came to know me.” 144
“Allah created Adam in His image.” 145
“The aim from [creating] the world is the Perfect Man.”146
Ādam’s creation in the image of God is what accomplishes the initial purpose of creation.
God wanted to be known, and could only be known by a creation in His image; therefore, Ādam
was created in the image, and came to know Allah.
It is apt to conclude this chapter with the thought that every mention of the image
tantamounts to an implicit mention of the mirror. The foregoing sections condensed the
connections of the image within the larger fabric of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism, from ontology to
perfection and knowledge. The mirror metaphor is the surface underlying these conceptions and
is, thus, definitive of several of the cornerstone teachings of al-Shaykh al-Akbar. The imagery
proposed is of a creation mirroring its Creator, with varying degrees of accuracy, reaching
perfection in the mirror of the Perfect Man.

Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 66.
Ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, (1985), 2:114.
146
al-Ghurab, al-Insān al-kāmil, 7.
144

145

52

——— Chapter 3 ———

God in the Mirror, Man in the Mirror

Imagine that you’re standing in a hall of mirrors, and can see infinite reflections of
yourself. But not all mirrors are straight or polished to perfection, some are concave, some are
convex, some are tarnished or moldy. In all of them, a reflection of you remains, but only a
perfect mirror can be said to truly reflect your image.
And if out of compassion and supreme power you could grant the gazes of your
reflections the ability to see, and their minds the ability to ponder, the reflection in the perfect
mirror would look straight at you, reciprocating your gaze. A reflection in a crooked mirror
would believe itself to be larger than you, greater, another would perceive itself to be smaller, or
upside down.147 The reflection in the tarnished mirror, with blurry vision, would not be able to
recognize the original you from all the other reflections. And if the selves in the mirrors were
incapable of seeing you directly, they would have to resort to your reflection in the perfect
mirror, as it would be the truest representation of your reality.
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1.

The Implications of the Mirror
“He who has been brought into existence in the image of something, this thing is also in
his image. So, by the same means of how he sees his image, he sees He whom he is in the
image of. By the same means that he knows himself, he knows He whom he is in the
image of.”148
In al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s thought, the implications of the mirror are predominantly

oriented toward knowledge and witnessing as is recapitulated in this syllogism. The realization
that the relation between God, man, and the world is one of spectator and mirror(s) is man’s key
to unlocking knowledge and witnessing that which he is an image of. The perfect man’s
constitution renders him a polished mirror, consequently, the most perfect receptacle of the
divine image. Being a barzakh between God and the world, created in and reflecting the image of
both al-Ḥaqq and al-khalq, the perfect man witnesses and knows God and creation through
witnessing and knowing himself.149 The ontological configuration of a single reality standing as
an onlooker before a mirror grants the image in the mirror an immense opportunity for knowing
the reality in whose image it is created. Within this metamirror, the configuration reiterates itself
in various relationships, making it possible for man to know all the things that he reflects or that
reflect him. In a sense, this configuration serves a pedagogical purpose, through which man
knows his place and role in the cosmos.
There is another Scale, beside the Scale of the Law, which man must not put down and
which will remain in his hand in this world and the next. That is the Scale of
Knowledge… This Scale is like the Scale in the hand of the Real. Through it man
witnesses the Real’s weighing. Its relationship to the Scale of the Real is the relationship
of one person who has a scale in his hand to another person who has a mirror. The person
148
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with the mirror sees in it the scale, the weighing, and the weigher… The Unseen which
weighs, the weighing, and the Scale are the Presence of the Real, while the mirror is the
presence of man (ḥadrat al-insān). The weighing belongs to God , while the witnessing
belongs to him whose soul is a mirror. He is the truthful man of felicity.
God unveils this mystery to whom He will in order to show him in his mirror the form of
the divine creation and how things emerge and become manifest in existence from Him…
The possessor of this unveiling is “ever-creating” (khallāq), and that is what the Real
desires from him through this unveiling.150
God unveils man’s reality of being ever-creating to him through the mirror. As man
witnesses the divine act of creating and finds resonance of it in himself, his true nature is
revealed to him. The original weighing continues to belong to God, and to man belongs the
witnessing of this weighing, through which God informs man of the due right of things and
commands him to abide by it. As the vicegerent of God, it becomes man’s duty to give things
their due (ḥaqq), in the same way that God gave everything its creation (khalq).151 The relation is
mirrored and reciprocal, where on one side is God (al-Ḥaqq) and his duty al-khalq, and in the
mirror is man (khalq) and his duty ḥaqq. “Hence the Real enters into creation, and creation enters
into the Real in this situation.”152
This unveiling reveals to man the reality of the forbidden things and what a sin entails.
Through weighing, God brings into existence- creates- the preponderant things, the side of which
outweighs the other on the Scale. Witnessing this weighing, man sees what God avoided
bringing into existence. It becomes man’s duty to not create the avoided thing himself. A man
who is in the image of God, would naturally only create that which God created, and avoid that
which God avoided. His reality as a mirror image would necessitate it. If man fails to abandon
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what God avoided creating Himself, he would have transgressed and encroached on the due
(ḥaqq) of things.153
This witnessing belongs to the station of the perfect man, whose mirror reflects a perfect
image of God. Ibn ʿArabī also employs the mirror metaphor in explaining man’s destiny. He
teaches that God creates creatures according to what is known to Him of the creature. “We
determine our own properties through ourselves, though within Him.”154 Man exists in God’s
knowledge through God’s knowledge of Himself, then God creates man according to this
knowledge.155 “They will see that the Real did not do to them what they claimed He did, since
everything derived from themselves. He knew them only in keeping with their actual
situation.”156 This idea holds man in a position of responsibility and accountability, since it is his
reality which attracted and actualized a certain constitution for him, and consequently, a certain
life path.
“Recompense (jazāʾ) is a self-disclosure within the mirror of the Being of the Real.
Hence nothing comes back to the possible things from the Real except that which is given by
their own essences in their states.”157 Man’s destiny is reflected in the mirror of al-Ḥaqq. What
man believes to be God’s reward or punishment, is in fact the mirror reflection of man’s own
actions. Man is in this sense, therefore, the creator of his own destiny, as his destiny merely
reflects him to himself. The mirror’s operation in the previous contexts illustrates its role in
exhibiting man to himself and unveiling his reality.

Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 178.
Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 83, quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 299.
155
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 298.
156
Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 83, quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 299.
157
Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 119, quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 299.
153
154

56

2.

“He who knows himself, knows his Lord.”
In the experience of the divine as well as man, the mirror plays a role pertaining to

knowledge. For God, the mirror is the locus of manifestation of the names. On its surface, the
realities of the names become apparent, and through this appearance, God can witness Himself
and potentially be known to an ‘other’. Thus, the purpose of creation as discussed in earlier
chapters would be attained.
In man’s experience, the mirror is the means by which he is granted the image. Man,
being the reflection in the mirror, can acquire knowledge of the real entity standing before the
mirror through gazing at himself, a privilege which only a mirror can make possible. By looking
into himself, at his image, man can know the onlooker standing before the mirror. This method
of knowing, which begins with knowledge of the self, is articulated in the famous ḥadīth, “He
who knows himself knows his Lord.” While the authenticity of the tradition is contested, it is
ubiquitously cited in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s writings.158 In the absence of the tradition itself, the
concept is presented in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s own expression.
“The prophet said, ‘Many a man attained perfection, but among women, only Mary and
Asiya did’. By perfection he [the prophet] means their knowledge of them [themselves],
and their knowledge of them [themselves] is their very knowledge of their Lord.”159
3.

al-Rabb al-Muqayyad wa al-Rabb al-Muṭlaq
The domain upon which we embark in this section is essentially the domain of the

ineffable. It is elusive and intricate. We approach from a place of theory and attempt to present
structured ideas; however, it must be acknowledged that the lived experience of the individual
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dealing with the following themes is far from straightforward or structured. These are the matters
dwelling in man’s heart of hearts, a place which often escapes man’s own knowledge and
awareness. For this reason, it is worth noting that while al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s notions maintain
profound cohesion, the path of navigating this web of ideas requires one to look in many
directions at the same time. The current question is concerned with the nature of the God who
occurs in man’s knowledge, the nature of the God whom man is commanded to worship, and the
knowledge of God that the mirror provides or inhibits in both situations.
3.1 al-Rabb al-Muqayyad
The names Allah and al-Rabb, among others, are names of the divine essence (asmāʾ
al-ḍhāt). In many respects, there is an affinity in meaning between both names; however, in the
Quran and ḥadīth the name al-Rabb appears in conjunction to possessive pronouns far more
frequently than the name Allah, which ensues in the former appearing in contexts where the later
does not. The name al-Rabb is frequently mentioned in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings in conveyance of
notions of the individual experience of the divine, where man encounters his Lord. He writes:
“ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm is not ʿAbd al-Karīm, and ʿAbd al-Ghafūr is not ʿAbd al-Shakūr. For
every servant there is a name, which is his Lord (rabbahu). Akin to a body, and this name
is its heart.”160
The myriad divine names manifest in mankind, and these manifestations naturally vary as
the names vary among Themselves. To understand the prophetic ḥadīth, “He who knows himself
knows his Lord,” in light of this notion of Ibn ʿArabī’s would mean that he who knows himself
knows the name that is his Lord. Thus, if ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm knows himself, he would know
al-Ḥalīm, and if ʿAbd al-Karīm knows himself, he would know al-Karīm. The correspondence
between the Lord and the vassal opens the channel of knowledge and recognition. Even though
160
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the knowledge of the two servants would be indisputably majestic, it appears to be mutually
exclusive, and therefore, imperfect.
The discussion at hand treads a subtle yet definitive line. Ibn ʿArabī teaches that within
every divine name is all divine names, which proposes that in knowing al-Ḥalīm, ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm
acquires a degree of knowledge of all divine names in accordance with his capacity.161 The
dilemma with the servant’s knowledge is the narrowness characteristic of delimitation
(al-taqyyīd) as opposed to the encompassing capacity of nondelimitation (al-ʾiṭlāq). On this
aspect, Ibn ʿArabī writes the following exposition of ḥadīth al-taḥawwul, where man’s
knowledge of God in a delimited image stands between him and the recognition of God on the
Day of Judgement.162
Do not you see me appear to them, on the day of Judgment, in an image and a sign
(ʿalāma) other than what they know, so they deny my Lordship (rubūbīyya) and of it [the
image] they seek refuge, and in it, they seek refuge, but they do not feel. Rather, they say
to this who appears, “We seek refuge in Allah from you! And here we are awaiting our
Lord.” At this moment, I come out upon them in the image which they have, so they
admit to my Lordship, and to their servanthood. Hence, they are worshippers to their
sign, and witnesses to the image settled in them.
So whoever of them says that he has worshiped Me, his statement is false, and he has
confounded Me with his lie. And how could this be rightful for him, when he denied Me
upon appearing to him? Whoever restrains Me to one image to the exclusion of another,
imagines he has worshiped, and this is the enabled reality hidden in his heart. He
imagines that he worships Me, while he denies Me (yajḥadunī).
And those who know, it is impossible to hide Me from their sights, because they have
become absent to creation and to their own mysteries. So none appear to them, in them,
other than Me. And they do not intelligize of the existents other than My names. 163
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The difference between those who know a restrained image of God and those who Ibn
ʿArabī refers to here as, “those who know” is vast. The indetermination of the knowledge of the
latter group indicates an equally nondelimited and unrestricted knowledge. The core idea of this
passage is reminiscent of Ibn ʿArabī’s treatment of prayer in the last chapter of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam,
and the metaphor of the mirror, while unspoken, is a precise representation of Ibn ʿArabī’s
conception of prayer. Ibn ʿArabī establishes his ideas on the foundation that man prays upon
God, and God prays upon man. While the reciprocity is evident here, following Ibn ʿArabī’s
further explanation of the role of he who is performing the prayer unravels a peculiar feature to
witnessing God in prayer.
Ibn ʿArabī explains that when God performs prayer upon man, he does so with his name
al-Ākhir, as He succeeds the presence (wujūd) of man in prayer. Man precedes with his presence,
following which, God becomes present to him. The reason is that this is God as He is in man’s
belief (al-ʾillāh al-muʿtaqad).164 Therefore, it is a sound configuration that man’s presence
precedes the presence of that which is present in his belief. As was discussed earlier in this
research, the constitution of man determines his share of knowledge. Ibn ʿArabī reiterates that
man creates a God in his heart in accordance with what is found in this individual’s readiness.165
Al-Shaykh al-Akbar references al-Junayd’s succinct teaching on knowledge of God, “The color
of the water is the color of the vessel.”166 This is to say al-ʾillāh al-muʿtaqad who prays upon
man is a God whom man creates in his image, to the extent of man’s knowledge of himself.167
Curiously, in the obverse situation, when God is the object of man’s prayer, the end result
of the situation appears to be the same for man, instead of exhibiting reciprocity as would be
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assumed. In praying upon God, al-Shaykh al-Akbar writes, “He [God] only looks upon us by an
image with which we came to Him.”168 One interpretation of this would imply that if man arrives
into God’s presence in prayer in the image of mercy, God would look upon him with the image
of The Most Merciful. Contemplating both positions for man, being the performer and receiver
of prayer, the circle appears to begin and end with him. As the performer of prayer, man
encounters a God whom he has created in his image, as is plainly evident in the words of
al-Junayd. And as the recipient of prayer, man is met with an image of God, which is reflecting
his own image. In prayer, man stands “in a hall of mirrors”, where he witnesses and is witnessed
by himself.169
Man praises the God who is in his belief and to whom he has bound himself. Whatever
was of his deed returns to him. Hence, he has not praised but himself. He who praises the
craftsmanship indubitably praises the craftsman, as its wellness or unwellness is due to its
maker. The believed God is made for His spectator, He is his making, thus, his praise of
what he has believed is his praise of himself.170

Prayer is the mirror in which man marvels at his own creation. Simultaneously, while
perhaps in a more elusive sense, man also confronts the consequences of what he has created in
his image. Man’s praise of his believed God is his praise of himself for the majesty of his
creation. Since the believed God arises from what man has known mercy, beauty, majesty, to be
in himself, this image of God is equipped to evoke resonance and poignance in man, acquiring
deeper affinity to him. The love and devotion man has to his believed God (al-ʾillāh
al-muʿtaqad) is the love and devotion for the delimited image of God (al-ʾillāh al-muqayyad)
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whom he has created in his image. This delimitation hinders man from knowing God as he is,
nondelimited to a single image.
The believed God is made for His spectator, He is his making, thus, his praise of what he
has believed is his praise of himself. And therefore, man vilifies the belief of another. If
he had been just, it would not have been rightful for him. However, the holder of this
private God is ignorant, undoubtedly, due to his opposition of what someone else believes
concerning Allah. Had he known what al-Junayd had said, ‘The color of the water is the
color of the vessel,’ it would have been rightful for each holder of a belief what he
believed. And he would have known Allah in every image, and every belief. He is a
speculator (ḍhān) rather than a knower. Therefore [Allah] said, ‘I am present in my
servant’s speculation about me.’ This means: I do not appear to him except in the image
which he believes; if he wishes, he can nondelimate, and if he wishes, he can delimate.171
Ibn ʿArabī’s treatment of prayer in this chapter of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam seems to propound the
idea that prayer is a locus of witnessing oneself. It is an incubator for actualizing the prophetic
ḥadīth, “He who knows himself knows his Lord,” on the level of the private relation that man
has with the name that is his Lord, as was discussed earlier. In the mirror of prayer, as man
occupies the positions of the witness and witnessed, he is potentially capable of becoming
cognizant of the name that is rabbuhu. Through man’s discernment of his reflections, which he
believes to be the image(s) of God to whom he prays, and which he believes to be witnessing
him in his prayer, he arrives at the knowledge of his private Lord.
Interestingly, Ibn ʿArabī does not appear to be reproachful of this situation. Man’s self
witnessing in prayer seems to be the raison d’etre of prayer. ًWhile it is an obstruction that the

Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, 402.
 و لو أنصف لم، و لهذا يذم معتَقَ َد غيره. ثناؤه على نفسه، فثناؤه على ما إعتقده، فهو صنعته،"و إله المعتقَد مصنوع للناظر فيه
 إذ لو عرف ما. فى ذلك العتراضه على غيره فيما اعتقده فى هللا، إال أن صاحب هذا المعبود الخاص جاهل بال شك.يكن له ذلك
، فهو ظان ليس بعالم. و كل معتقد، و عرف هللا فى كل صورة،"لون الماء لون إنائه" لسلم لكل ذى اعتقاد ما اعتقده:قال الجنيد
". ال أظهر له إال فى صورة معتقده فإن شاء أطلق و إن شاء قيد: "أنا عند ظن عبدى بى" أى:فلذلك قال

171

62

mirror of prayer reflects man to himself, and thus, stands as a veil between him and knowledge
of the nondelimited God, it is necessary to reiterate the validity of the original function of the
mirror of prayer as a locus of witnessing. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar emphasizes that knowledge of
God begins with man’s knowledge of himself.172 Since the world of acts is the most perceptible
to man, the names of acts is where man’s recognition commences. His recognition begins with
what he finds within himself. “The first object of the acts that I witness is the nearest to me, and
that is myself.”173 It is due to the generosity that ʿAbd al-Karīm witnesses in himself that he
refers this attribute to his Lord and recognizes Him to be al-Karīm. The two parallel strands of
knowledge concommit; knowledge of the soul, which is “an ocean with no shore” mirrors the
infinity of knowledge of God.174
In Kitāb al-muwāzana, Ibn ʿArabī addresses the reader in a manner exemplifying his
position on the knowledge available to the regular man through his own disposition. The station
of witnessing the nondelimited God remains unique to the perfect man, as will be discussed
shortly. Nevertheless, it is integral to point out that the regular man can achieve knowledge of
God through himself to the level of polishedness of his mirror. The following excerpt from
al-Futūḥāt illustrates the layers in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in regards to man’s knowledge of God
through self-witnessing.
There is a vast difference between one who says, ‘My heart spoke to me about my Lord,’even though he is of a high rank- and one who says, ‘My Lord spoke to me about My
Lord,’ meaning, my Lord spoke to me about Himself… The first one is God of belief
(rabb al-muʿtaqqad), and the second one is the God who is nondelimited…This is the
knowledge that occurs to the heart through self-witnessing.175
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However, identifying with man’s private God in the absence of the nondelimited God in
prayer leads to the unfamiliarity with God as he is, as is expressed in ḥadīth al-taḥawwl. Man’s
contemplation of God in his heart is conducive to witnessing God as He is in man’s belief. A
heart more equipped at encompassing numerous images of the divine will potentially achieve an
equally varied witnessing. Nevertheless, the witnessed God remains delimited to the images
residing in man’s heart. Only a man who is granted the station of “ḥaddathanī rabbī ʿan rabbī” is
granted a witnessing that transcends the bounds of delimitation. Hence, while in prayer the
mirror serves its function as a locus of witnessing of the self, and by extension of al-rabb
al-muqayyad, it appears to simultaneously be a veil preventing the witnessing of al-rabb
al-muṭṭlaq. This situation beckons the questions of whether witnessing the nondelimited God is
possible in man’s experience, and if so, where does man seek witnessing God in His
nondelimitation?
3.2 al-Rabb al-Mutlaq
Ibn ʿArabī’s response to this question is simultaneously simple and complex. The
simplicity resides in the coherence of his teachings, and the complexity appears in the form of
the layers of his answer, which is gleaned from the various contexts where he addresses the
subject of nondelimitation. In keeping with the approach of the ḥadīth as well as al-Shaykh
al-Akbar’s teachings, the launching point is the self. Ibn ʿArabī elucidates the hypothetical extent
of knowledge of God available to man as man consciously begins to know God through knowing
himself.176 Man’s self, potentially, continuously reveals him to himself, and with each revelation,
the image of man’s Lord increases. Upon his completion of knowing himself and the images of
God connected with this knowledge, man commits himself to knowing God through other
176
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creatures. Succeeding this station, man begins to praise God by his names of incomparability,
which signify God’s Essence, hence, His nondelimitation.177 However, al-Shaykh al-Akbar
obliterates this possibility on the basis of the impossibility of the initial premise. Man cannot
reach a completion point of knowing himself, since this knowledge is boundless; consequently
and among other reasons, he cannot arrive at the station of knowing God in His nondelimitation
through witnessing the names of His Essence.178 However, the layers of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s
thought orient the discussion towards the nexus connecting man, the creature of the world of
manyness, to the absolute oneness of the divine Essence.
The Prophet said, “He who knows himself knows his Lord.” He did not say, “knows the
Essence of his Lord,” since the Lord’s Essence possesses nondelimited Independence.
How could the delimited thing know the Nondelimited? But the “Lord” demands the
vassal, without doubt. So in “Lord,” there is a whiff of delimitation. Through this the
created thing knows its Lord.179

Man knows of the Essence a name, one which defines his relationship to and place from
the Essence. A vassal and Lord, the definition shapes and subsumes the subsequent implications.
Al-Shaykh al-Akbar alludes to the difference between the domain of the Essence, which is
unknowable to man, and the domain of the names, through which God makes Himself knowable
to man. The domain of the Essence is the realm of absolute oneness, a oneness which subsumes
and transcends the oppositional manyness of the realm of the names. Therefore, the magnitude of
the names of the Essence is unique, as they represent the last threads connecting the ineffable to
the world of utterance. Knowledge of God in his absolute nondelimitation is inaccessible to man,
rendering knowledge of his Lord man’s highest hope. While in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s previous
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explanation of the progression of man’s knowledge of God, he positioned man’s advancement to
know God through the world to be consequent upon finishing knowing God through himself, this
conditional relationship does not withstand across his writings. In conjunction with the fact that
Ibn ʿArabī’s thought predominantly pivots around the concept of creation as a locus of
manifestation and witnessing as a whole, he explicitly specifies certain receptacles for witnessing
God in a number of contexts.
Al-Shaykh al-Akbar recites the prophetic ḥadīth “the man of faith is the mirror of the
man of faith” to point out the knowledge man acquires through witnessing himself in the mirror
of his brother in faith.180 Veiled by his intoxication with himself, man’s flaws dwell in his
blindspots and escape his scrutiny. Through witnessing his brother’s nature, man recognizes the
praiseworthy as opposed to blameworthy traits, and reflects this discernment upon himself.
Seeing the traits in his brother is man’s opportunity to face his own beauty or ugliness. As
previously addressed, there is a positive correlation between man’s knowledge of himself and his
knowledge of his lord. Therefore, witnessing the self in the mirror of man’s brother ultimately
serves man’s quest of knowing God.
Of substantial bearing on the subject of loci of witnessing is Ibn ʿArabī’s exposition in
the last chapter of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. The chapter discusses the bezel of wisdom particular to
prophet Muḥammad, where Ibn ʿArabī proposes an interpretation to the prophetic ḥadīth, “Three
things were made beloved to me of your world, women, perfume, and my comfort was made to
be in prayer.”181 He contrasts the relation between God and man to man and woman on the basis
of origin, since man was created in the image of God, and woman was created in the image ofand from- man.182 Man occupies the position of an isthmus between God and woman. In women,
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man sees himself as affecting (fāʿil), being the origin from which woman emerged.
Simultaneously, in himself, man sees himself as affected (munfaʿil), emerging himself from God.
In the absence of the witnessing happening through women, man only experiences himself as
affected and is incognizant to his active role. Therefore, al-Shaykh al-Akbar recognizes
witnessing God in women to be the most perfect and complete.183
Ibn ʿArabī not only acknowledges the potential knowledge contained within witnessing
God in creation, he also detects a hierarchy of perfections. Left to his own devices, man’s
enamorment with himself overtakes him. He dwells on a God whom he has created in his image,
and calls him his God of belief. Certainly, the image is rigidly delimited and exclusive of all that
does not carry resonance with this man. Instead of worshipping his Creator, man worships his
own creation.184 Transcending the bounds of his own self, man exposes himself to witnessing the
images of God reflected in others; he witnesses God in his brothers in faith, and in women, both
granting him a richer knowledge of himself, and by extension, a more varied witnessing of God.
However, these loci of witnessing can also obstruct man’s vision. The brother in faith’s mirror
would only reflect God not only to the degree of its polishedness, but also according to its own
shape.185 This situation is inescapable and al-Junayd’s words animate it, “The water takes on the
colors of its cup;” the witnessing is always influenced by the witnesser, man, and the witnessed,
the receptacles of God’s manifestations.186 For al-Shaykh al-Akbar, this is the reason why man is
commanded to worship God through following the messenger.187 Ibn ʿArabī incorporates another
layer to this context, which corroborates the place of the mirror metaphor in his thought at large.
Akin to prayer, which serves the function of a mirror but is also a veil, the perfect man is also
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simultaneously a mirror and a veil. And while it may seem counterintuitive, veils are sometimes
the most perfect loci of witnessing.
4.

The Necessity of the Veil
The following anecdotes aid in imprinting in the imagination a glimpse of the contents of

the forthcoming sections.
When Moses returned from his Lord, God clothed his face in light as a sign of the
authenticity of that which he declared; and so fierce was this light that no one could look
on him without being blinded, so that he had to cover his face with a veil in order that
those who looked in his face would not be taken ill when they saw him. Our teacher Abū
Yaʿzā in Maghrib was [a] Moses-like [type of saint] (mūsawī al-wirth), and God had
bestowed on him the same miraculous sign. No one could look him in the face without
losing their sight. He would then rub the man who had looked at him with one of the
garments he was wearing and God would give him back his sight. Among those who saw
him and were blinded in this fashion was our shaykh Abū Madyan, on an occasion when
he paid him a visit. Abū Madyan rubbed his eyes with the garment that Abū Yaʿzā was
wearing and recovered his sight.188
Know that God has seventy thousand veils of light and darkness. If He were to lift them,
the lights (subuḥāt) of His face would burn that which the sights of God’s creatures fell
on. Therefore, we see God by a face other than the face He sees us by. The burning and
the effect (al-ʾiḥtirāq wa al-ʾathar) occurs if the seeing occurs from one [the same] face,
which is the falling of your sight on His sight. And God had brought into existence in this
world an example of the mightiness and transcendence of this station. He created an
animal called al-ṣall. If man’s sight fell on it, and its sight on him on one line that the
gazes meet, man dies instantly.189
188
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4.1The Veil as a Locus of Witnessing
The veil is a means of protection, as well as an enforcer of courtesy (adab), a knowledge
which Ibn ʿArabī upheld upon being bestowed with the Muḥammadan inheritance.190 He
received the command to ascend the ladder of the Muḥammadan station. This evoked in him the
realization that the command was one of affliction. And so he stopped and asked for the veil, and
the veil descended between him and the maqām. He attained of the maqām a share equivalent to
a single strand of hair, which supersedes the share of the rest of creation, who only acquire a
shadow of it.191 The veil, as Ibn ʿArabī explains, is the perfection of servanthood. In invoking the
veil, he attained the station of servanthood, and he received praise for his request.192
There is danger in the absence of the veil. Sights were lost before Moses’ face and the
faces of the inheritors of his line of sainthood, and lives were lost upon the meeting of the eyes
between man and animal. While veils are often the subject of narratives predominantly
concerned with the removal of the veil, less pronounced in popular imagination is the destruction
imminent at the moment of the reciprocation of the gaze.193 Only in the presence of the veil could
Moses’ companions look upon his face, and, instead of going blind, see. The veil seizes to be an
obstruction to witnessing. To the contrary, it becomes the sole means for witnessing to occur.
This section is dedicated to paying attention to one particular veil, the perfect man, whose
function as a veil is precisely his function as a mirror in the thought of Ibn ʿArabī.
4.2 The Perfect Man as a Veil and a Mirror
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According to Ibn ʿArabī, the perfect man was granted perfection, through being in the
divine image, solely to serve his role as a substitute (badal) for God. Therefore, God referred to
him in His dialogue with the angels as a vicegerent (khalīfa).194 This vicegerent and his
successors are alone granted the divine image, while the rest of mankind receive of it a share in
correspondence to the polishedness of their mirrors. Being the mirror of God, the vicegerent is
given every divine name, and appears in all the images in which God appears.195 Since the
function of a vicegerent is to supplant he who has instated him as His successor, upon the arrival
of the vicegerent, “God was veiled, as there is no rule for the vicegerent in the presence of He
who gave him vicegerency.”196 Ibn ʿArabī elucidates, “God has veiled everyone from Him, and
only manifested to the perfect man, who is His extended shadow (ḍhill).”197
The veil is only lifted between God and the perfect man, who himself then becomes
God’s veil. In providing further explanation of this configuration, Ibn ʿArabī uses the metaphor
of the robe or garment.198
Pride is the garment of al-Ḥaqq, and it’s none other than you. God is clothed with you as
you are His image, as the garment is in the image of its wearer… Almighty said: ‘The
heart (qalb) of my servant encompassed Me.’ Hence, if you reverse the perfect man
inside out (ʾiḍhā qalabt al-ʾinsān al-kāmil), you see al-Ḥaqq, and man is irreversible, and
so the garment does not become the wearer of He whom it is a garment for.199
“The garment is a barrier between Him and the world.”200
The perfect man stands as a veil between God and the world in the same way a garment
veils its wearer from the world. Because of this isthmus-like placement, the perfect man
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witnesses God in the world, with the outer layer of the garment, and witnesses God as He is, with
the inner layer of the garment. The garment- the perfect man- takes the image of the wearerGod- and exhibits His image to the world. Through the veil that is the garment, the world
witnesses the image of the wearer, while the wearer Himself remains concealed. “The world does
not witness but man, who is the garment.”201 In God’s speech to the perfect man, He says, “You
are My mirror… through you I became manifest to My creation.”202 And since burning lurks
behind the meeting of the gazes, and since God has veiled everyone from Him, to the exception
of the perfect man, who is His garment, His robe, His mirror, creation’s most sublime
opportunity at witnessing God lies in witnessing the perfect man. Through the configuration of
his unique position and reality, the perfect man serves as a veil and a mirror, a situation
reminiscent of the words Ruzbihān Baqlī heard from his Lord, “He who sees thee, sees Me.”203
4.3 Witnessing God in Prophet Muḥammad
The station of the perfect man is the station of theophany. He manifests God to Himself
and the world. His constitution enables him to fulfill this role. The constitution of Ādam, in other
words the degree of polishedness of his mirror, granted him knowledge of the names. He was the
polishing of the mirror of the world, through which the names could see their reflection
manifested in the world.
The matter appears to repeatedly return to the ‘word’. From Ādam who was given
knowledge of words which are the divine names, to Moses the Conversor of God (kalīm Allah),
to Jesus the Word of God (kalimat Allah). Profound dwelling on this subject extends beyond the
scope of the current research, but of relevance here is the word’s manifestation in the life and
nature of prophet Muḥammad.
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One defining characteristic of prophet Muḥammad as a primordial reality as well as a
corporeal presence is comprehensiveness (jamʿīyya). This attribute has a corollary in all
significant aspects of his existence. This comprehensiveness itself is the result of the nature of
the prophet’s unique constitution.
It is known that the messengers are the most balanced (aʿdal) of all people in
constitution… There is no prophet who was not sent specifically to a designated people,
since he possessed a specific and curtailed constitution. But God sent Muhammad with an
all-inclusive message for all people without exception. He was able to receive such a
message because he possessed an all-inclusive constitution which comprises the
constitution of every prophet and messenger, since he has the most balanced and most
perfect of constitutions and the straightest of configurations.204
In the same way that Ādam’s constitution made it possible for him to receive knowledge
of the names, the constitution of prophet Muḥammad granted him comprehensiveness, wherein
lies the manifestation of the word in his life, and his unparalleled perfection.
Understanding the character of the Qurān is integral to formulating an extensive
perception of the character of prophet Muḥammad. The name of the holy book denotes the
significance of its reading and recitation. The initial reception of the name, however, placed
emphasis on the alternative and more primary meaning of the Arabic root q.r.ʾ, which is to gather
and collect.205 The two names of the holy book, Qurān and Furqān, indicate its function to be to
simultaneously gather and discriminate.206 Chittick observes that Ibn ʿArabī devotes more
attention to the encompassing quality of the Quran, which includes all the other holy books and
scriptures. Hence, it manifests the character of jamʿīyya.207 Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s law of
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correspondence emerges in this context in the form of the compatibility between the character of
the Qurān and the character of Muḥammad. In the previous chapters it was discussed that
al-Shaykh al-Akbar emphasizes that knowledge only occurs when a correspondence between
knowledge and the object of knowledge is found. In the same vein, Ibn ʿArabī enunciates that
Qurʾān descended upon Muḥammad because of the quality of jamʿīyya found in both of them.208
Al-Ḥaqq gave His messenger the full sum of the words (jawāmiʿ al-kalim), which is
sound judgement and decisive statement (faṣl al-khitāb). Ādam was perfected by the
names. And the perfection of Muḥammad, peace be upon him, is by the full sum of the
words, and the names are of the words.209
Through the Qurʾān, prophet Muḥammad was given jawāmiʿ al-kalim, his particular and
all-inclusive perfection. Ibn ʿArabī denominates the perfect man ‘the all-comprehensive
engendered thing’ (al-kawn al-jāmiʿ).210 All-comprehensiveness is a staple quality in all perfect
men, as they manifest the name Allah, the all-encompassing divine name. However, as they
differ in rank, the perfect men embody jamʿīyya in varying degrees of perfection. Therefore, the
holy book which characterizes all-comprehensiveness par excellence could only descend upon
the perfect man in whom jamʿīyya’s manifestation is excellent.
This compatibility, as was encountered in earlier chapters, ensues from the configuration
of the image. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar invokes the image and furthers the discourse around the
compatibility between the characters of the Qurʾān and prophet Muḥammad. The words of
ʿĀisha, “His [the prophet’s] character was the Qurʾān” resonate with Ibn ʿArabī to the letter.211
He perceives identicality of characters denoting that witnessing one subsequently means
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witnessing the other. The claim of the previous chapter was that in Ibn ʿArabī’s writings,
mentions of the image are implicit mentions of the mirror. In this context, he reiterates the
function of the implied mirror as the preserver of the image of the physically absent reality. In
the same way that the perfect man serves as a substitute (badal) and vicegerent of the divine
among creation by being in His image, the Qurʾān is the locus where the image of the prophet
subsists after his material departure. By witnessing the Qurʾān, man witnesses prophet
Muḥammad.
Whoever wishes to see the messenger of God, those of his umma who are not his coevals,
he ought to look at the Qurʾān. If he looks at it, there is no difference between looking at
it and at the messenger of God. It is as if the Qurʾān formed a corporeal image called
Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Allah Ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib. 212

Tracing the origin of the prophet’s all-comprehensiveness, Ibn ʿArabī observes the
prophet’s constitution. He compares the clays from which Ādam and his descendents were
created to that from which Muḥammad was created. Unlike Ādam and his offspring, whose clay
is a mixture of light and darkness, “Muḥammad’s clay was created from the location of the
kaʿba, the site of belief in God Almighty.” 213 Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s discourse on constitutions is
concerned with the degree of polishedness of man’s mirror. Ādam’s constitution allowed for the
divine names to manifest in his mirror and occur in his knowledge. And the unparalleled purity
of prophet Muḥammad’s constitution made it possible for the sum of all words, encompassing
the divine names and the Qurʾān, to manifest in him. This jamʿīyya is a testament to the complete
polishedness of the prophet’s mirror, because to reflect all-inclusiveness- in other words,
everything- one’s mirror must contain nothing.
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What then does this polished mirror reflect of the divine? This part of the discussion
pertains to the theme of the personal Lord (rabb), the delimitation and nondelimitation of God.
Al-Shaykh al-Akbar explains that all righteous believers who are of the station of Polehood
(qutbīyya) must manifest the name Allah. They, however, are also given another name specific to
them, by which they’re called outside their Polehood station.214 “Hence, Moses’ name is ʿAbd
al-Shakūr (“Servant of the Grateful”), David’s specific name is ʿAbd al-Malik (“Servant of the
King”), and Muḥammad’s name is ʿAbd al-Jāmiʿ.”215 Since Allah is the all-inclusive divine
name, both divine names that prophet Muḥammad is given emphasize all-comprehensiveness.
Therefore, the prophet’s jamʿīyya transcends and subsumes the comprehensiveness of all other
prophets.
It is due here to refer to an earlier point of discussion, namely, Ibn ʿArabīs words, “For
every servant there is a name, which is his Lord (rabbahu). Akin to a body, and this name is its
heart.”216 In Muḥammad’s heart, the nondelimitation of his Lord is doubly present, as Allah and
al-Jāmiʿ. The complete polishedness of his mirror, the utter effacement of himself, renders him
the perfect man par excellence, the most perfect locus of manifestation of the divine. In him, the
totality of God’s all-comprehensiveness and nondelimitation are witnessed, to the extent that
they can possibly be witnessed. In this relationship, the merits of the mirror metaphor surface,
the quintessence of which is ‘He/not He’, the Akbarian archetypal yes/no. Being the most perfect
image of the divine, Muḥammad reflects all the attributes of the divine. More importantly, he
reflects God’s Lordship by embodying absolute servanthood.217 Since God’s Essence, where his
nondelimitation dwells, is unknown and inaccessible, the perfect man reflects it through
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reflecting incompatibility, being God’s reversed image in the mirror; the perfect man reflects the
nondelimited God by being the “nondelimited divine thrall.”218
Man’s self is the lens through which he witnesses God. As an obstruction, it drives man
further into his self-bemusement and he worships a God whom he has created in his image. As a
means of knowledge, the self reveals man’s Lord to him to the extent that he has truly
encountered himself. In both cases, man is faced with his God of belief (ilāh al-muʿtaqqad), a
delimited image inclusive only to that which bears resemblance and resonance with the
constitution of man. The experience is narrow, constricted, and the temptation to dwell in and on
the self perpetuates it. Being of an impure constitution, as all animal men (al-insān al-ḥayawān)
are, man witnesses an image in his tarnished mirror and mistakes it for God. His state emulates
that of Plato’s prisoners in the cave. Since it is his wont to look through the narrow lens of the
self at a reflection in an impure mirror, man is absent to the possibility of witnessing a perfect
reflection of the nondelimited God.
The self is not intrinsically narrow, to the contrary, it is in fact nondelimited. Muḥammad
witnesses his Lord in his mirror and encounters his own image. However, because his character
is jamʿīyya and he is created in the image of Allah and al-Jāmiʿ, the image of Muḥammad’s
private Lord (al-ilāh al-muqayyad) is identical to the image of God as He is. Being the most
perfect of perfect men (al-kāmil al-akmal), Muḥammad is the excellence of the station of being
created in God’s image.219 He is God’s most perfect reflection, hence Muḥammad’s God of belief
(ilāh al-muʿtaqqad), whom he encounters in his own mirror, is identical to the nondelimited God.
This is the station God alludes to in ḥadīth al-taḥawwul, “So none appear to them, in them, other
than Me. And they do not intelligize of the existents other than My names.” 220 This is the
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function religions serve for Ibn ʿArabī. Man’s refuge from the trap of worshipping a God of his
own creation is to “worship the God brought by the Messenger.”221 He writes, “The intelligent
person is he who abandons what he has in himself concerning God for what the messengers have
brought from God concerning God.”222 The completion of the divine teachings is in the
all-comprehensiveness of Muḥammad’s message. And the most perfect witnessing of God is in
witnessing rabb Muḥammad in the mirror of Muḥammad.
I conclude with an excerpt from al-Futūḥāt, which epitomizes the tenors of this chapter
in al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s own expression.

There is no prophet who was not sent specifically to a designated people, since he
possessed a specific and curtailed constitution. But God sent Muhammad with an
all-inclusive message for all people without exception. He was able to receive such a
message because he possessed an all-inclusive constitution which comprises the
constitution of every prophet and messenger, since he has the most balanced and most
perfect of constitutions and the straightest of configurations.
Once you come to know this, and once you desire to see the Real in the most perfect
manner in which He can become manifest in this human plane, then you need to know
that this does not belong to you. You do not have a constitution like that possessed by
Muhammad. Whenever the Real discloses Himself to you within the mirror of your heart,
your mirror will make Him manifest to you in the measure of its constitution and in the
form of its shape…So cling to faith and follow him! Place him before you as the mirror
within which you gaze upon your own form and the form of others. When you do this,
you will come to know that God must disclose Himself to Muhammad within his mirror. I
have already told you that the mirror displays an effect in that which is seen from the
point of view of the observer who sees. So the manifestation of the Real within the mirror
of Muhammad is the most perfect, most balanced, and most beautiful manifestation,
because of the mirror’s actuality. When you perceive Him in the mirror of Muhammad,
221
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you will have perceived from Him a perfection which you could not perceive in respect
of considering your own mirror.”223
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Conclusion
The mirror metaphor resides in an isthmus between absence and presence. On the one
hand, the mirror is ubiquitous in Ibn ʿArabī’s own expression in a manner proposing that it bears
the potential of offering a panoptic view of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s thought at large. Primarily, this
potential is not due to the mere frequency at which Ibn ʿArabī employs the mirror, rather, it is
due to the centrality of the notions and contexts wherein he invokes the metaphor. In contrast to
this influential presence in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought, the mirror’s reception in secondary literature is
rather ambivalent. It is not unusual for the mirror metaphor to be utilized in illustrating
al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s ideas in secondary literature, however, the function of the mirror is mostly
restricted to a convenient metaphor garnering sporadic and coincidental attention. This thesis
exhibited a number of the ways in which the mirror occupies the position of a web underlying
and connecting Ibn ʿArabī’s seminal ideas. Osman Yahya resembles Ibn ʿArabī to an elite
composer who created a melody in his imagination and divided and disseminated it into parts
dispersed over his opus, which formulate the comprehensive melody if assembled.224 Perhaps the
mirror is precisely this Akbarian melody, hidden in plain sight.
The theory of Unity of Being is often considered to be the most controversial in Ibn
ʿArabī’s thought. Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s refraining from using the phrase waḥdat al-wujūd, and
the copious occasions in which he invokes the mirror metaphor to explain his thoughts on Being
provide sufficient reason to lend this alternative reading attention. As opposed to pantheism and
panentheism, which are classifications extraneous -as well as inaccurate, and inviting of
condemnation- to Ibn ʿArabī’s legacy, the mirror metaphor suggests an alternative constellation
of terminologies, which preserve Ibn ʿArabī’s original expression. Most importantly, it embodies
224
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the quintessential He/Not He. Al-Jazāʾrī remarks the capacity of the mirror metaphor in
elucidating divine manifestations. He writes in al-Mawāqif:
One of the greatest examples for divine manifestations (tajalliyat) is polished substances,
specifically mirrors… Imagining His majestic manifestation is very difficult, therefore,
most people- except this group blessed by mercy- imagined it through incarnation (ḥulūl),
or unity (ʾittiḥād), or flowing (sarayān), or the likes of them.225
The significance of the mirror arises from what it is a metaphor for, the image. In
al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s thought, the image is the definitive element for the occurrence of
knowledge, love, perfection, and above all, existence. Consequently, the locus most receptive of
the divine image is the one granted the highest degrees of knowledge, love, and perfection.
Al-Hakim writes, “The texts of Ibn ʿArabī successively describe the world as a mirror, and the
mirror means the place which accepts the image of a thing and not the thing itself.”226 While
panentheism acknowledges God’s transcendence beyond the bounds of the world’s corporeality,
and in doing so, mitigates pantheism’s radical identification of God with the world, panentheism
does not define the world’s relation to God in a manner congruent with Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine.
The world being in the image of God is both the most fundamental and most influential relation
al-Shaykh al-Akbar establishes between God and the world.
Ibn ʿArabī’s depiction of this relation reveals, however, that the image does not suffice as
an accurate description. It is not solely an ‘image’; rather it is a mirror image. The mirror
metaphor preserves the integrity of al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s ontological stance on whose Being is
real and whose imaginal. Similar to the example of a pair of twin siblings. They can be said to be
in each other’s image, and both of them are equally real. If the depiction of Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology
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was restricted to ‘the image’, it would remain inconclusive and inexhaustive of his doctrine on
Being. When the image is specified as a mirror image, his various teachings fall into place. The
metaphor defines the relation as one between an onlooker, who is Absolute Being, and his image
in the mirror, which earns the appearance of Being from Him.
In Ibn ʿArabī thought, creation emerged to fulfill an epistemic purpose. Its mission is to
answer to God’s desire to be known by an other. As Ibn ʿArabī’s universal law of correspondence
mandates across his teachings, a resemblance must exist between a subject and object for the
desired outcome to occur. In the context of knowing God, al-Shaykh al-Akbar specifies that only
a creation bearing resemblance to God can uncover knowledge of Him.227 “The best mirror,
which reflects the most complete and exact image, is the image of the prophet Muhammad.”228
The mirror metaphor does not only convey the reality of the world as the image of God, and its
existence as dependent upon Him, it also conveys how creation accomplishes its epistemic
mission through the most perfect mirror.
Ibn ʿArabī’s thought pivots around images and his description of the world culminates in
a universe of mirrors. He perceives a single reality manifesting in myriad forms in accordance
with the constitution of the locus -the shape and degree of polishedness of the mirror- wherein it
manifests. The world is created in the image of God, the perfect man is created in the image of
the world and God, woman is created in the image of man, and Ādam is created in the image of
prophet Muḥammad’s name.229 The prophet is the image of the Qurʾān, and imagination and the
perfect man are the most excellent manifestations of the image of God.230 These myriad mirrors
entail that wherever man looks, he is bound to see. The seeing is influenced by both the seer and
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the seen. The seer’s seeing is glossed over by his own self, consequently, man sees to the degree
of purity of his constitution only that which bears resonance with him. Perhaps this is why some
find solace in gazing at the shadows on the wall, and some find it in gazing at themselves on the
surface of water. For al-Shaykh al-Akbar, since two veils stand between man and witnessing
God, that of man’s own self and that of the locus of his witnessing, and since the veil of the self
is inevitable, man’s most sublime opportunity lies in witnessing God in a locus representing a
diaphanous veil, that which God used to veil Himself. The perfect men are God’s veils, and
prophet Muḥammad as a veil, being the most perfect of perfect men, is the most diaphanous.
The visual component is intrinsic to Ibn ʿArabī’s thought as is signified by the repetitive
mentions of the image and the mirror and, more importantly, by the profundity of the notions
they are employed in conveying. The theme of single realities -and an ultimate single reality- and
various manifestations is demonstrative of the underlying narrative of his thought at large. The
relation between unity and multiplicity is encapsulated in the visual representation of one reality
standing in a hall of mirrors, all of which reflect this one reality according to their own nature
and purity. In the mirror embodying the constitution of letters, the reality appears as a letter, and
in the mirror of corporeality, it manifests as a mountain or a river. In the mirror with the most
balanced constitution and polishedness, the most perfect image of the single reality occurs.
Therefore, for the rest of the manifestations this mirror becomes the ultimate reference in which
the image of the single reality can be witnessed.
Bearing upon Ibn ʿArabī’s ontology and epistemology, and consequently, offering
insights on his notions around soteriology and eschatology, the mirror occupies a unique position
in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. It is a vantage point upon his doctrine. In the palace of Ibn ʿArabī’s
ideas, where his theories reside and congregate, mirrors ornament the walls of various chambers,
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as well as the hallways connecting them. But beyond their decorative function, the placement of
these mirrors suggest that they can be integral structural elements. Although subtle and
overlookable, the guidance of the mirrors carries the promise of illuminating a path for
navigating the Akbarian premise.
Lastly, these words by al-Ghurab are the ideal coincidence with which to conclude this
work. “Al-Shaykh Ibn al-ʿArabī, may God be pleased with him, is a Muḥammadan mirror with
the utmost purity, balance, and uprightness, no one saw in him except himself.”231
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